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ABSTRACT 
The purposes of insolvency law and environmental law are diametrically 
opposed. Each regime has been developed with little, if any, consideration 
of the inevitability of a clash with the other law. Through re-organisation 
and liquidation, insolvency law pursues the objectives of enabling the 
debtor to make a fresh start, and maximising returns to creditors through 
the expeditious distribution of the debtor’s assets. The objective of envi-
ronmental law is to apply the polluter pays principle to ensure that a com-
pany or other person who pollutes the environment pays to remediate it 
instead of the costs being met by taxpayers. Remediating contamination 
tends to take a long time, with the precise costs not known until the con-
tamination has been remediated. Handling claims for remediating contam-
ination in insolvency proceedings thus has the potential to prolong them, 
and consequently delay the debtor’s fresh start or the distribution of its 
assets. 
This article examines clashes between bankruptcy/insolvency law and 
environmental law in the United States and the United Kingdom, and the 
very different approaches adopted by courts in those jurisdictions in an 
effort to resolve the conflicts between these areas of law. Whilst there is 
much more case law on environmental claims in bankruptcy proceedings in 
the United States, the number of insolvent companies that own or occupy 
land that requires remediation due to their operations is increasing quite 
rapidly in the United Kingdom. The Scottish Coal case, especially, illus-
trates the critical consequences for debtors, creditors and the public purse 
when a company with substantial environmental liabilities enters insolven-
cy proceedings. 
The article also examines a new type of proceedings involving insolvent 
companies and companies with limited assets; claims to remediate contam-
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ination against their directors and officers. This situation has already arisen 
in Ireland and Canada – again with very different approaches in each ju-
risdiction. The article continues the examination of this relatively new 
clash between claims for remediating contamination in environmental law 
against persons related to a company that is insolvent or has limited assets 
by examining the importance of developing other effective courses to fol-
low in response to the problem of corporate environment liability. These 
courses include direct parent company liability and the development of 
directors’ duties. 
The article concludes that the reach of the polluter pays principle has 
had remarkably little effect on bankruptcy/insolvency law to date. The 
fundamental principle of limited liability in company law has prevailed in 
many, if not most, cases against the fundamental principle of the polluter 
pays in environmental law. It is, thus, necessary to develop a more collabo-
rative relationship between environmental, company and insolvency law. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Many countries have enacted liability regimes to remediate land con-
taminated by historic pollution. None of the regimes could be – or is – tru-
ly fair because they necessarily impose retroactive liability on some per-
sons, such as current landowners, who cannot be described as “polluters” 
in any real sense. In some countries, the designation of these so-called pol-
luters has triggered an elaborate process in which the “polluters” have at-
tempted to avoid or transfer liability and enforcing authorities have at-
tempted to ensure that the costs of remediating the contamination are paid 
by anyone but the taxpayer.1  
Persons that have been targeted have not only challenged their liability 
but, depending on the jurisdiction, have brought contribution actions 
against other potential polluters and made claims  against their general 
liability insurance policies – sometimes with great success even though 
many policies were issued before the legislation was enacted. Other “pol-
luters” have instituted insolvency proceedings, sometimes attempting to 
leave their environmental liabilities behind in a re-organization rather than 
liquidating. 
 
 
* Blanca Mamutse, Lecturer, University of Surrey School of Law 
** Valerie Fogleman, Professor, Cardiff University School of Law. 
1 See, e.g., Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. ASARCO, Inc., 909 F.2d 1260, 1263 n.2 (9th Cir. 
1990) (applying state law to cut off successor corporation’s liability “would result in great 
expense to the taxpayer, which is contrary to CERCLA’s purposes”). 
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Governmental authorities have been equally resourceful. If a person 
identified by them as a polluter has insufficient, or no, funds to pay the 
costs of remediating contamination, they have sought to impose secondary 
liability on persons such as directors and officers, lenders, and affiliated – 
and sometimes unaffiliated – companies. If a polluter institutes insolvency 
proceedings, they have argued that re-organization does not discharge ob-
ligations to remediate contamination, or that the assets in an insolvency 
estate in a liquidation should pay remedial costs rather than other credi-
tors. Some authorities have even sought to impose liability on directors and 
officers of an insolvent company when the insolvency estate has insufficient 
assets to remediate contamination.  
This article examines the elaborate procedures involving environmen-
tal claims against insolvent companies and the attitude of courts in decid-
ing claims concerning them. The article focuses on the United Kingdom,2 
doing so by contrasting systems in other jurisdictions and analyzing them 
with the legislation and approach taken by courts in the United Kingdom. 
The article begins by briefly examining the polluter pays principle and 
problems in its application in regimes to remediate contamination from 
historic pollution. Next, the article examines the main regime to remediate 
contamination from historic pollution in the United States, the Compre-
hensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
(“CERCLA” or “Superfund”), in order to compare it with the main regime 
in the United Kingdom; Part 2A of the Environmental Protection Act 1990 
(“EPA 1990”).3 The purpose is to show how “polluters” have been desig-
nated in the regimes to remediate contaminated land from historic pollu-
tion and how differences in the liability systems in these regimes have af-
fected approaches to environmental claims in insolvency proceedings, as 
well as illustrating the different approaches themselves. In the United 
States, the collision between the regime to remediate contamination from 
historic incidents and bankruptcy law, neither of which was drafted to ac-
commodate the other, began about 30 years ago and is highly developed. 
In the United Kingdom, the collision between environmental and insolven-
cy law is much more recent and involves only a handful of cases. The 
number of cases is, however, steadily increasing.  
 
 
2 Due to the increasing devolution of environmental law in the United Kingdom, this 
article discusses primarily English law. References to the law of Wales, Scotland and 
Northern Ireland are made as appropriate. 
3 Part 2A is in force in England, Wales and Scotland. It has not been brought into force in 
Northern Ireland. See Waste and Contaminated Land (Northern Ireland) Order 1997, S.R. 
1997/2778, part III (not in force). The statutory guidance to Part 2A differs between 
England, Scotland and Wales. Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, 
Environmental Protection Act 1990: Part 2A; Contaminated Land Statutory Guidance 
(Apr. 2012) (England); Natural Scotland, Scottish Executive, Environmental Protection 
Act 1990: Part IIA Contaminated Land; Statutory Guidance: Edition 2 (Paper SE/2006/44, 
May 2006); Welsh Government, Guidance Document, Contaminated Land Statutory 
Guidance – 2012 (WG19243). 
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The article then turns to proceedings under environmental, not insol-
vency, law to analyze the approaches of courts in Ireland, and to a lesser 
extent Canada, in applying the polluter pays principle in respect of direc-
tors and officers of companies that are insolvent or cannot otherwise pay 
to remediate contamination caused by them. In considering the potential 
expansion of liability for environmental harm, the article discusses English 
law to examine parent company liability and the impact of the incorpora-
tion of environmental concerns into directors’ statutory duties. The article 
concludes by suggesting issues to consider in dealing with future environ-
mental claims involving insolvent companies in the United Kingdom in 
view of the increasing number of such claims. 
II. THE POLLUTER PAYS PRINCIPLE AND ITS APPLICATION TO THE 
REMEDIATION OF CONTAMINATION FROM HISTORIC 
POLLUTION 
In the late 1960s, many governments realized that traditional legisla-
tion to protect human health was no longer adequate in the face of increas-
ingly severe pollution incidents such as the Torrey Canyon and the Santa 
Barbara oil spills and the increasingly rapid deterioration of air and water 
quality. The governments reacted by enacting legislation to protect the en-
vironment as well as human health.4 Although legislation to protect the 
environment was focused, not on protection of the environment for its own 
sake, but on its effect on human health,5 it nevertheless resulted in a mas-
sive volume of new legislation. 
The new environmental legislation introduced regulatory regimes to 
control air and water pollution and to manage the handling and disposal of 
waste. The regimes were much more stringent than previous legislation, 
with associated increased costs to businesses that were required to pur-
chase and operate technologically advanced equipment to reduce emissions 
of pollutants and to pay increased costs of disposing of waste in landfills 
that were engineered to be more secure than previous disposal methods, 
many of which had simply been unlined pits and lagoons. 
 
 
4 See R. v. Carrick Dist. Council, ex parte Shelley, [1996] ENVTL. L. REV. 273, 279, 
[1996] J.P.L. 857 (Q.B.D.). 
5 Such legislation includes the Clean Water Act and the Clean Air Act in the USA. In the 
UK, it includes the EPA 1990. See, e.g., Lisa Heinzerling, Reductionist Regulatory 
Reform, 8 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 459, 490-91 (1997) (“laws regulating the pollution of 
air, water, and the land – have the dual purpose of protecting human health and the 
environment. In most cases . . . these laws will take the protection of human health as 
their first concern . . . natural resource protection will often end up as a kind of tag-along 
value, icing on the cake of a regulation otherwise justified by the benefits of improving 
human health”); Adam I. Davis, Ecosystem Services and the Value of Land, 20 DUKE 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 339, 344-45 (2010) (major federal environmental laws in United 
States since 1970s include goal of minimising effect of industrial pollution on human 
health). 
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As governments introduced the new controls, they became concerned 
that some countries would establish themselves as “pollution havens,” that 
is, intentionally keeping their environmental legislation lax in order to en-
tice businesses to locate in them due to lower capital and operating costs. 
In 1972, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(“OECD”), whose members included the most developed countries that 
were introducing the new legislation, recommended that they adopt the 
polluter pays principle.6 The principle is an economic mechanism designed 
to adopt a harmonized approach to internalize environmental costs into 
businesses that cause pollution. The internalized costs include the costs of 
measures taken by businesses to prevent and control pollution from its ac-
tivities and related administrative costs of regulatory authorities.7 Business-
es may then include the costs in the price of their goods in the knowledge 
that their competitors are subject to the same controls and are, thus, also 
likely to increase the price of their goods. Governments recognized that 
some business would be unable to afford the new technologically advanced 
equipment and would have to close. They, therefore, made exceptions to 
the polluter pays principle to avoid socio-economic problems from the loss 
of jobs and other hardship. These exceptions, which included government 
subsidies, were to be used only in “exceptional circumstances.”8  
The adoption of the polluter pays principle by OECD countries was 
rapid.9 By the mid-1970s, the principle was being referred to as a reason 
for enactment of the continuing stream of more stringent and extensive 
environmental legislation instead of being referred to only as a means to 
internalize costs resulting from it. The polluter pays principle had become 
an integral part of environmental legislation and came to be cited almost 
like a mantra as if its meaning is self-evident. 
Meanwhile, a new problem had surfaced; contamination from past 
pollution that continues to cause risks to human health and the environ-
ment. Perhaps the most notorious example is Love Canal in the United 
States, where a school and houses had been built in the 1950s next to a 
known hazardous waste dump. The dump, which was about 1,000 meters 
long, 25 meters wide, and three to five meters deep and located in imper-
meable clay, contained approximately 25,000 tons of over 200 chemicals.10 
 
 
6 OECD, Recommendation of the Council on Guiding Principles Concerning International 
Economic Aspects of Environmental Policies (C (72)128, 1972). 
7 See NICOLAS DE SADELEER, ENVIRONMENTAL PRINCIPLES: FROM POLITICAL SLOGANS TO 
LEGAL RULES 27 (2002). 
8 OECD, Recommendation of the Council on the Implementation of the Polluter-Pays 
Principle. (C (74)223, 1974). 
9 See OECD, Joint Working Party on Trade and Environment, The Polluter-Pays Principle 
as It Relates to International Trade, 10 (COM/ENV/TD (2001)44/final, Dec. 23, 2002). 
10 See VALERIE FOGLEMAN, ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITIES AND INSURANCE IN ENGLAND 
AND THE UNITED STATES 745 (2005) (school was built 26 metres north of its planned 
location, surrounded by subsurface drain due to concerns that waste would cause odours 
and damage school’s concrete foundations). 
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Heavy rain in the mid to late 1970s caused chemicals in the dump to break 
through the near surface, spilling over in a bathtub-like effect. Black sludge 
entered basements in the houses, and drums exploded onto the surface.11 
Widespread publicity ensued across the United States about Love Canal 
and the risks from it and other contaminated sites.12 
In December 1980, the U.S. Government, motivated by Love Canal 
and similar sites, enacted CERCLA.13 The legislation established the Super-
fund program, which was to be led by the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency (“EPA”) to remediate abandoned and unregulated sites containing 
hazardous waste. Legislation already existed to remediate contamination, 
including the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”) and the 
Clean Water Act. RCRA authorized the EPA to require persons responsible 
for non-hazardous and hazardous waste that “may present an imminent 
and substantial endangerment to health or the environment” to remediate 
it.14 The main purpose of RCRA, however, was to control the handling of 
waste from its cradle to its grave, including technical and financial 
measures concerning treatment, storage and disposal facilities; it was not 
designed to remediate waste that was already in the grave. 
Countries, such as the United Kingdom, in which there had not been 
widespread publicity concerning problems from former waste sites, also 
began to consider whether “Love Canals” existed in their territory15 and 
whether they should enact specific legislation to remediate contamination 
from historic pollution.16 Like the United States, the United Kingdom al-
ready had legislation to remediate contamination, including the statutory 
nuisance regime17 and the Water Resources Act 1991.18 As in the United 
 
 
11 Id. at 741-48. Love Canal was not the only area affected by past pollution that 
experienced problems in the 1970s. In 1978, authorities in Lekkerkerk, in the Netherlands, 
discovered a dump containing about 1,600 leaking drums of hazardous waste under a 
housing estate built on former marshland in the early 1970s. 
12 The number of television, radio and newspaper accounts was massive. The New York 
Times, alone, printed 180 reports about Love Canal between 1978 and 1987. Other 
contaminated sites that received national publicity, and generated concerns by the U.S. 
Congress, included the Valley of the Drums, a 13-acre dump and drum recycling site in a 
valley in Bullitt County, Kentucky, that contained between 20,000 and 30,000 leaking 
unlabelled drums of hazardous waste. 
13 Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980), codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601 et seq. (2012). 
14 42 U.S.C. § 6973(a) (2012). 
15 See Select Committee on Science and Technology, Hazardous Waste Disposal, Report, 
1980-1, H.L. 273-II, 63, § 6 (memorandum by Department of Environment: “existence of 
a Love Canal in the UK cannot . . . be denied categorically. However, the UK is a small 
country and the chances of substantial indiscriminate dumping having occurred seem 
likely to be small”).  
16 The United Kingdom subsequently introduced a provision in the EPA 1990 to require 
waste regulation authorities to inspect their areas to detect threats to human health and the 
environment from closed landfills and to remedy any contamination that caused such a 
threat. The provision was eventually repealed, never having been brought into force. 
Environmental Protection Act 1990, c. 43, § 61 (repealed) (U.K.) (hereinafter EPA 1990). 
17 EPA 1990, pt. III. 
2 Br. J. Am. Leg. Studies (2013) 
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States, however, the legislation was not designed to remediate contamina-
tion from past pollution, with the result that its effect was “patchy.”19 
Throughout the late 1980s and the 1990s, the role of the polluter pays 
principle was slowly being extended from its roots as an economics princi-
ple in international trade to internalization of costs from the remediation 
of contamination.20 As it was extended, variations in the principle emerged, 
with broad differences in its scope21 and degree22 in different jurisdictions. 
Major differences involved the identity of the persons who would be “pol-
luters”. The OECD has not addressed this issue, even in the context of leg-
islative controls on future pollution.23 The European Union subsequently 
identified the “polluter” on economic principles by stating that the point at 
which the fewest economic operators exist should be selected, with the 
“polluter” to be the person or persons at that point.24 This approach is not, 
however, especially relevant to liability for the remediation of contamina-
tion from historic pollution. The principle adapts badly to legislation that 
imposes liability because it is too late to pass on costs incurred in remediat-
ing contamination in the price of goods when competitors may not have to 
incur such costs. The persons who pay the cost of remediating pollution in 
retroactive liability regimes are probably current shareholders of compa-
nies named as polluters.25  
 
 
18 Water Resources Act 1991, c. 57 (Eng. & Wales). 
19 Environment Committee, Contaminated Land (HC 1989-90, 170-I) ¶ 8. 
20 See DE SADELEER, supra note 7, at 33-34; see also Sanford E. Gaines, The Polluter-
Pays Principle: From Economic Equity to Environmental Ethos, 26 TEX. INT’L L.J. 463, 
484-85 (1991) (principle was moving cautiously “fairly far toward a liability conception 
of what polluters should pay”). 
21 See Boris N. Mamlyuk, Analyzing the Polluter Pays Principle Through Law and 
Economics, 18 SE. ENVTL. L.J. 39, 44-46 (2009).  
22 See Frank Biermann, Frédéric Böhm, Rainer Brohm, Susanne Dröge & Harald Trabold, 
The Polluter Pays Principle under WTO Law: The Case of National Energy Policy 
Instruments (Environmental Research of Federal Ministry of the Environment, Nature 
Conservation and Nuclear Safety, Research Report 201 19 107, UBA-FB 000555/e, Dec. 
2003), 5-6 (referring to polluter pays principle in Germany as one of three basic principles 
for environmental policy and commenting on wide variation in its implementation, with 
most OECD countries applying “weak” principle whilst only a few countries, such as 
Germany and Denmark, apply “strong” principle (including environmental taxes); also 
noting that most developing countries have not adopted the principle due to adverse 
economic conditions). 
23 See DE SADELEER, supra note 7, at 38. 
24 Council Recommendation of 3 March 1975 regarding cost allocation matters and action 
by public authorities on environmental matters, 75/436/Euratom, 1975 O.J. (L 194), 1, 2, 
Annex, § 3; see also DE SADELEER, supra note 7, at 54-55 (channelling liability responds 
to polluter pays principle’s redistributive and preventive functions). 
25 See Don Fullerton & Seng-Su Tsang, Environmental Costs Paid by the Polluter or the 
Beneficiary? The Case of CERCLA and Superfund 4 (National Bureau of Economic 
Research, NBER Working Paper No. 4418, Aug. 1993) (“CERCLA liability is established 
on the commonly held principles that polluters pay for pollution. However, because this 
liability is retroactive, it is probably borne by current shareholders”). 
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There is an argument that equity demands that past polluters pay such 
costs. While this may well be – and probably is – correct for companies 
that were aware that their activities were causing harm to human health 
and the environment when they carried them out, it would have been im-
possible for companies to dispose of waste according to today’s technical 
standards because the technology did not exist at that time. Further, an 
argument that the true costs of production were in effect subsidized by the 
public is simply wrong; the public benefited from the lower prices of the 
goods being produced.  
III. REGIMES TO REMEDIATE CONTAMINATION FROM HISTORIC 
POLLUTION 
The regimes to remediate contamination from historic pollution in the 
United States and the United Kingdom are vastly different, not only in their 
purpose, scope, implementation and enforcement, but also in the identity 
of the persons designated as “polluters.” 
A. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, 
and Liability Act 
The liability system in CERCLA is not specifically based on the pol-
luter pays principle, perhaps due, among other things, to CERCLA being 
signed into law on 11 December 1980,26 when application of the principle 
was mostly limited to the internalization of environmental costs in interna-
tional trade.   
CERCLA’s primary purpose is to enable the federal government swift-
ly to clean up abandoned and uncontrolled hazardous waste sites.27 The 
U.S. Congress knew that significant funding would be required because, by 
the time CERCLA was enacted, the EPA had investigated 7,000 sites sus-
pected of, or known to pose, risks to human health and the environment, 
and had already identified 397 sites that needed remediation, at an average 
estimated cost between $3 million and $5 million each.28 Congress, there-
fore, created a trust fund, commonly known as the Superfund, established 
 
 
26 Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980).  
27 See Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc. v. Reilly, 889 F.2d 1380, 1386 (5th Cir. 1989); 
Dickerson v. Adm’r, EPA, 834 F.2d 974, 978 (11th Cir. 1987); J.V. Peters & Co. v. 
Adm’r, EPA, 767 F.2d 263, 264 (6th Cir. 1985). 
28 126 Cong. Rec. H9153, H9155 (1980) (statement of Rep. Florio), reprinted in 1980 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 26,336, 26,338, reprinted in 2 Senate Committee on Environment and 
Public Works, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (Superfund), Public Law 96-510, 97th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 686 (committee print 1983, 3 volumes) [hereinafter CERCLA Legislative History]. 
The EPA had estimated, in 1979, that there were 30,000 to 50,000 uncontrolled hazardous 
waste sites in the US, of which between 1,200 and 2,000 were posing a serious risk to 
human health. H.R. Rep. No. 96-1016(I), 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 18, reprinted in 1980 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6120, reprinted in 2 CERCLA Legislative History at 47, 49. 
2 Br. J. Am. Leg. Studies (2013) 
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at $1.6 billion for five years,29 to be funded by taxes.30 Levying taxes, pri-
marily from petro-chemical industries, followed the polluter pays principle 
because, in particular, the levies were on chemicals that would be cleaned 
up under the Superfund program. In addition, due to the levy applying to 
all companies that were producing the same petro-chemicals, they could 
internalize the costs.31 In order to ensure that contaminated sites that posed 
the greatest risks to human health and the environment would be remedi-
ated first, Congress established a national priorities list of sites to be reme-
diated.32 
CERCLA’s secondary purpose is to make persons who were responsi-
ble for the disposal of hazardous waste that needed to be cleaned up bear 
the responsibility and cost of doing so.33 In order to facilitate swift clean 
ups, liability under CERCLA is strict,34 joint and several,35 and retroac-
 
 
29 42 U.S.C. § 9631(a) (repealed). 
30 CERCLA established four taxes to fund the Superfund trust fund. Most funding was 
raised by an excise tax on crude oil. 26 U.S.C. §§ 4611-12. The other taxes were a 
chemical feedstocks excise tax, id. §§ 4661-62, a chemical derivatives excise tax, id. §§ 
4671-72, and an environmental corporate income tax. id. § 59A. The taxes were based on 
industries associated with the contaminated sites. The taxes raised approximately $13.5 
billion between 1981 and 1998. They lapsed in 1996 and have not been reauthorized. See 
EPA Supports Superfund “Polluter Pays” Provision / Agency Submits Administration’s 
Guidance to Congress (EPA press release, June 21, 2010) (“EPA sent a letter to Congress 
in support of reinstating the lapsed Superfund ‘polluter pays’ taxes . . . taxes should be 
paying for teachers, police officers and infrastructure that is essential for sustainable 
growth -- not footing the bill for polluters”). 
31 See Frank P. Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation and Liability (“Superfund”) Act of 1980, 8 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 
1, 8 (1982) (Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works “concluded that the 
chemical industry, with its vast earnings, would be able to internalize these costs”). 
32 See 40 C.F.R. § 300.425 (2013). 
33 See Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 922 F.2d 1240, 1247 (6th Cir. 1991) (citing 
Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 805 F.2d 1074, 1081 (1st Cir. 
1986)). 
34 CERCLA does not specifically provide that it imposes strict liability. Instead, it adopted 
the standard of liability under section 311 of the Clean Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(32) 
(2012); see 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (2012). It is well settled, however, that the standard of 
liability under CERCLA is strict liability, as it is under section 311 of the Clean Water 
Act. Idaho v. Hanna Mining Co., 882 F.2d 392, 394 (9th Cir. 1989); see H.R. Rep. No. 
253(I), 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 74 (“No change has been made in the standard of liability 
under CERCLA. As under section 311 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 
U.S.C. 1321 (2012), liability under CERCLA is strict, that is, without regard to fault or 
wilfulness”), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2856, reprinted in 3 Senate 
Committee on Environment and Public Works, A Legislative History of the Superfund 
Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (Public Law 99-499), 101st Cong., 2d 
Sess. 1764, 1837 (committee print 1990, 7 volumes). 
35 See United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 805-11 (S.D. Ohio 1983) 
(defendant is jointly and severally liable unless it can show that harm was divisible and 
that there is reasonable basis to apportion harm). The court noted that Congress deleted a 
requirement for joint and several liability in all cases, and held that Congress intended 
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tive.36 Congress also ensured that it would be relatively easy for the EPA to 
enforce the regime. Liability attaches if: 
• a site is a “facility”37 
• from which there is a “release or threatened release”38 
• of a “hazardous substance”39 
• into the “environment.”40  
 
 
liability to “’be determined from traditional and evolving principles of common law.’” Id. 
at 808 (quoting 126 Cong. Rec. 30,932 (1980) (remarks of Sen. Randolph), reprinted in 
1980 U.S.C.C.A.N., reprinted in 1 CERCLA Legislative History, supra note 28, at 686; 
see also O’Neil v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176, 179 n.4 (1st Cir. 1989) (“courts generally . . . 
have declined to place the burden of showing that defendants are "substantial" 
contributors on the government, recognizing Congress' concern that cleanup efforts not be 
held hostage to the time-consuming and almost impossible task of tracing all of the waste 
found at a dump site”), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1071 (1990). 
36 United States v. Ne. Pharm. & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 732-33 (8th Cir. 1986) 
(“Although CERCLA does not expressly provide for retroactivity, it is manifestly clear 
that Congress intended CERCLA to have retroactive effect”). 
37 See United States v. Ne. Pharm. & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 743 (8th Cir. 1986)(“term 
‘facility’ should be construed very broadly to include ‘virtually any place at which 
hazardous wastes have been dumped, or otherwise disposed of’”), cert. denied,  484 U.S. 
848 (1987); see also New York v. General Elec. Corp., 592 F. Supp. 291, 296 (N.D.N.Y. 
1984) (“Congress sought to deal with every conceivable area where hazardous substances 
come to be located”). 
38 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22) (2012) (subject to limited exclusions, term “release” means “any 
spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, 
leaching, dumping, or disposing into the environment (including the abandonment or 
discarding of barrels, containers, and other closed receptacles containing any hazardous 
substance or pollutant or contaminant”); see, e.g., New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 
F.2d 1032, 1045 (2d Cir. 1985) (“leaking tanks and pipelines, the continuing leaching and 
seepage from the earlier spills, and the leaking drums all constitute "releases . . . 
Moreover, the corroding and deteriorating tanks, Shore's lack of expertise in handling 
hazardous waste, and even the failure to license the facility, amount to a threat of 
release”). 
39 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (2012) (defining “hazardous substance” as any substances 
designated pursuant to the Clean Water Act, RCRA, Clean Air Act – over 700 substances 
– but not including “petroleum, including crude oil or any fraction thereof which is not 
otherwise specifically listed or designated as a hazardous substance [or] natural gas, 
natural gas liquids, liquefied natural gas, or synthetic gas usable for fuel (or mixtures of 
natural gas and such synthetic gas)”. Liability for remediating oil, as indicated above, is 
under the Oil Pollution Act 1990. 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701 et seq. (2012). 
40 42 U.S.C. § 9601(8) (2012) (defining “environment” as “(A) the navigable waters, the 
waters of the contiguous zone, and the ocean waters of which the natural resources are 
under the exclusive management authority of the United States . . . , and (B) any other 
surface water, ground water, drinking water supply, land surface or subsurface strata, or 
ambient air within the United States or under the jurisdiction of the United States”). 
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All the above terms are defined broadly. The term “persons” is also 
defined broadly;41 it includes “all known forms of business and commercial 
enterprises,”42 including successor corporations43 and bankruptcy estates.44 
There are four categories of liable persons, called potentially responsi-
ble parties (“PRPs”), all of whom are primarily liable. They are: 
• “the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility;”45 
• “any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous sub-
stance owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous 
substances were disposed of;”46  
• generators of hazardous substances, that is, persons who “ar-
ranged for” the disposal or treatment of waste;47  and 
 
 
41 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21) (2012). The term “person” is defined to mean “an individual, 
firm, corporation, association, partnership, consortium, joint venture, commercial entity, 
United States Government, State, municipality, commission, political subdivision of a 
State, or any interstate body.” Id. 
42 Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 922 F.2d 1240, 1247 (6th Cir. 1991). 
43 Id. at 1245 (term “corporation” includes successor corporation); Louisiana- Pacific 
Corp. v. ASARCO, Inc., 909 F.2d 1260, 1263 n.2 (9th Cir. 1990) (applying state law to 
cut off successor corporation’s liability “would result in great expense to the taxpayer, 
which is contrary to CERCLA’s purposes”); see also In re Acushnet River & New 
Bedford Harbor Proceedings re Alleged PCB Pollution, 712 F. Supp. 1010, 1019 (D. 
Mass 1989) (“[i]t would be manifest injustice . . . to permit [successor corporation] to 
contract away [corporation’s] liability for PCB contamination”). 
44 In re T.P. Long Chem., Inc., 45 B.R. 278, 284 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985) (“this court has 
no difficulty in finding that the debtor, and hence the debtor’s estate, is a person as 
defined by CERCLA”). 
45 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1) (2012). The term “facility” includes offshore as well as onshore 
facilities. Id. §§ 9601(20)(A)(17), (18). The term is defined broadly to include anywhere 
that a hazardous substance is located. Id. § 9601(9) (“(A) any building, structure, 
installation, equipment, pipe or pipeline (including any pipe into a sewer or publicly 
owned treatment works), well, pit, pond, lagoon, impoundment, ditch, landfill, storage 
container, motor vehicle, rolling stock, or aircraft, or (B) any site or area where a 
hazardous substance has been deposited, stored, disposed of, or placed, or otherwise come 
to be located; but does not include any consumer product in consumer use or any vessel”).  
Exceptions to the term “facility” are narrow; they include consumer products in consumer 
use. Id. § 9601(9) (B). The word “and” has been interpreted to mean “or”; it thus includes 
owners who are not operators and vice versa. See United States v. Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d 
1550, 1554 n.3 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1046 (1991). 
46 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2) (2012). CERCLA incorporates the term “disposal” from 
RCRA, in which it is defined as “the discharge, deposit, injection, dumping, spilling, 
leaking, or placing of any solid waste or hazardous waste into or on any land or water so 
that such solid waste or hazardous waste or any constituent thereof may enter the 
environment or be emitted into the air or discharged into any waters, including ground 
waters.” Id. § 9601(2); see id. § 6903(3). 
47 Id. § 9607(a) (3) (“any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for 
disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or 
treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by any other party 
or entity, at any facility or incineration vessel owned or operated by another party or 
entity and containing such hazardous substances”). The term “arranged for” is not defined 
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• transporters, that is, persons who transported a hazardous sub-
stance to a treatment or disposal facility selected by them.48 
Courts have interpreted all four categories of PRPs broadly due to 
CERCLA’s remedial nature. CERCLA’s three defenses,49 meanwhile, have 
been construed narrowly.50 The defenses are: an act of God; an act of war; 
an act or omission of an unrelated third party, and any combination of the 
three defences.51 
As stated by Justice Brennan, “[t]he remedy that Congress felt it need-
ed in CERCLA is sweeping: everyone who is potentially responsible for 
hazardous-waste contamination may be forced to contribute to the costs of 
cleanup.”52 Further, the EPA is not limited to enforcing CERCLA in re-
spect of sites that are contaminated by historic pollution; it may enforce 
other regimes such as RCRA. 
Classifying the types of PRPs in the four categories does not appear to 
have been particularly contentious. The Senate Bill, which was introduced 
on 11 July 1979 and which became CERCLA, broadly identified persons 
who would be liable. They were to be owners or operators of a facility or 
 
 
but has been construed broadly. E.g., Florida Power & Light Co. v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 
893 F.2d 1313, 1317 (11th Cir. 1990) (“liberal judicial interpretation of the term is 
required in order that we achieve CERCLA's ‘overwhelmingly remedial’ statutory 
scheme”) (“In light of the broad remedial nature of CERCLA, we conclude, as other 
courts have, that even though a manufacturer does not make the critical decisions as to 
how, when, and by whom a hazardous substance is to be disposed, the manufacturer may 
be liable. For liability to be imposed on such a manufacturer, the evidence must indicate 
that the manufacturer is the party responsible for "otherwise arranging" for the disposal of 
the hazardous substance”); United States v. Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 
1380 (8th Cir. 1989) (“Courts have also held defendants ‘arranged for’ disposal of wastes 
at a particular site even when defendants did not know the substances would be deposited 
at that site or in fact believed they would be deposited elsewhere”). 
48 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (4) (2012) (“any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous 
substances for transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites 
selected by such person”). Again, this category has been construed broadly to include 
persons that carried out filling and grading activities during the development of a site fell 
within the category because it entailed moving contaminants and depositing them at 
another area of the site. Tanglewood East Homeowners v. Charles-Thomas, Inc., 849 F.2d 
1568, 1573 (5th Cir. 1988) (filling and grading creosote pools). 
49 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (2012). In order to succeed in a defense, a PRP must prove that the 
release or threatened release and damages from it were caused “solely” by one of the de-
fences. Id. 
50 See, e.g., United States v. Stringfellow, 661 F. Supp. 1053, 1061 (C.D. Cal. 1987) 
(“rains were foreseeable based on normal climatic conditions and any harm caused by the 
rain could have been prevented through design of proper drainage channels. Furthermore, 
the rains were not the sole cause of the release. Therefore . . .  rains were not sufficient to 
establish an act of God defense pursuant to CERCLA”); Kelley v. Thomas Solvent Co., 
727 F. Supp. 1532, 1540 & n.2 (W.D. Mich. 1989) (“Defendants have not shown any 
evidence . . . that a third party was the sole cause of the release and concomitant harm”). 
51 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (2012). 
52 Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 21 (1989). 
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vessel from which there was an unlawful discharge, release or disposal of 
hazardous substances “and any other person who caused or contributed or 
is causing or contributing to such discharge, release, or disposal, including 
but not limited to prior owners, lessees, and generators, transporters, or 
disposers of such hazardous substances.”53 This loose terminology was 
subsequently revised to substantially its final form by June 1980.54 The 
congressional debates that followed the establishment of the four catego-
ries of PRPs did not tend to focus on the types of persons in the categories 
or refer to them as “polluters.” Instead, the debates focused on whether 
strict, and/or joint and several liability would be imposed, and the defenses 
to such liability.55  
When it enacted CERCLA, the U.S. Congress considered bankruptcy 
law tangentially. That is, CERCLA exempts state and local governments 
from liability as an owner or operator if they “acquired ownership or con-
trol involuntarily through bankruptcy, tax delinquency, abandonment, or 
other circumstances in which the government involuntarily acquires title by 
virtue of its function as a sovereign.”56 In such a case, the person “who 
owned, operated, or otherwise controlled activities at such facility immedi-
ately beforehand” is deemed to be the owner or operator of the facility.57 
Congress thus foresaw the potential for bankrupt companies to be PRPs 
but did not establish any criteria for handling environmental claims in 
bankruptcy proceedings. 
By November 1980, substantive debates on the Senate Bill had virtual-
ly ceased as Congress hurriedly enacted CERCLA in the waning days of a 
lame duck Congress. The Senate Bill that had been drafted by “a bipartisan 
leadership group of senators (with some assistance from their House coun-
terparts), introduced, and passed by the Senate in lieu of all pending 
measures [following which f]aced with a complicated bill on a take it -or-
leave it basis, the House took it, groaning all the way.”58 A detailed under-
standing of many of CERCLA’s provisions is, therefore, unavailable. The 
 
 
53 S. 1480, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., § 4(a), reprinted in 1 CERCLA Legislative History, 
supra note 28, at 155, 168-69. 
54 S. 1480, Staff Working Paper No. 2 (June 2, 1980), reprinted in 1 CERCLA Legislative 
History, supra note 28, at 245, at 266-67. 
55 See 126 Cong. Rec. (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 26,336, 
26,339, reprinted in 2 CERCLA Legislative History, supra note 28, at 222, 232 
(statement of Rep. Staggers) (“issues of liability were perhaps the most difficult . . . in 
fashioning this legislation. In many instances, it will be difficult to determine precisely 
what the responsibilities of a generator or a transporter of hazardous waste or the owner or 
operator of the hazardous waste disposal site should have been and what a particular 
defendant’s portion of cleanup costs should be”); see also J.P. Sean Maloney, A 
Legislative History of Liability under CERCLA, 16 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 517, 538 
(1992); Grad, supra note 31, passim. 
56 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20) (D) (2012). 
57 Id. § 9601(20) (A) (iii). 
58 Grad, supra note 31, at 1.  
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hurried drafting also inevitably led to ambiguities in CERCLA itself.59 
What was never an issue, however, was the ease with which the EPA was 
intended to enforce CERCLA to achieve the swift remediation of contami-
nated sites. As U.S. Assistant Attorney General Roger Marzulla subse-
quently stated: “With only slight exaggeration, one government lawyer has 
described a [CERCLA] trial as requiring only that the Justice Department 
lawyer stand up and recite: ‘May it please the Court, I represent the gov-
ernment and therefore I win.’”60  
The EPA,61 the U.S. Department of Justice,62 and commentators63 have 
referred to CERCLA’s implementation of the polluter pays principle in the 
liability provisions of CERCLA despite references to the principle in its 
enactment being largely absent. It is, perhaps, telling that persons that are 
responsible for remediating contamination from historic pollution are 
called PRPs, not responsible or liable parties. 
During the first five years after CERCLA’s enactment, the EPA’s en-
forcement of the Superfund program was lax and heavily biased towards 
 
 
59 See, e.g., Artesian Water Co. v. Gov’t of New Castle County, 851 F.2d 643, 648 (3d 
Cir. 1988) (“CERCLA is not a paradigm of clarity or precision. It has been criticized 
frequently for inartful drafting and numerous ambiguities attributable to its precipitous 
passage”); Mid Valley Bank v. N. Valley Bank, 764 F. Supp. 1377, 1387 (E.D. Cal. 1991) 
(“extraordinarily poorly drafted statute”); In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor 
Proceedings re Alleged PCB Pollution, 716 F. Supp. 676, 681 n.6 (D. Mass. 1989) 
(“[l]ike many a court before it, this Court cannot forbear remarking on the difficulty of 
being left compassless on the trackless wastes of CERCLA. This Court has previously 
noted the statute’s incomprehensive nature”). 
60 See William D. Evans, Jr., The Phantom PRP in CERCLA Contribution Litigation: EPA 
to the Rescue?, 26(43) ENV’T REP. (BNA) CURR. DEV. 2109, 2110 (Mar. 8, 1996). 
61 E.g., US EPA, Memorandum, Interim Guiding Principles for Good Samaritan Projects 
at Orphan Mine Sites and Transmittal of CERCLA Administrative Tools for Good 
Samaritans,  2 (June 6, 2007) (“Importantly, the Good Samaritan Initiative preserves 
CERCLA’s ‘polluter pays’ principle”); EPA, CERCLA/Superfund Orientation Manual 
(Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, Technology Innovation Office 
EPA/542/R-92/005, Oct. 1992) II-2 (“Superfund program was founded on the premise 
that the polluter must pay for problems created by the polluter”); EPA, The Buck Stops 
Here; Polluters are Paying for Most Hazardous Waste Cleanups, Superfund Today 1 
(EPA 540-K-96/004, June 1996) (“public’s demand that polluters pay for cleanup also 
makes it critical that EPA find those who are responsible”). 
62 Statement of Lois J. Schiffer, Assistant Attorney General, Environment and Natural 
Resources Division, U.S. Department of Justice Before the Superfund, Waste Control, and 
Risk Assessment Subcommittee of the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee 
(Mar. 21, 2000) (“Congress also decided that the parties that created these environmental 
hazards should pay for cleaning them up. This ‘polluter pays’ principle is implemented in 
the liability and enforcement provisions of the statute”). The U.S. Department of Justice 
brings judicial proceedings on behalf of the EPA and other federal administrative 
agencies. 
63 See, e.g., Thomas A. Rhoads & Jason F. Shogren, Current Issues in Superfund 
Amendment and Reauthorization: How is the Clinton Administration Handling Hazardous 
Waste, 8 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 245, 245 (1998) (referring to “reliance on the 
‘polluter pays’ principle in CERCLA”). 
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industry.64 Criticism of the EPA and realization by the U.S. Congress that 
the problem of abandoned and uncontrolled waste sites was much worse 
than originally foreseen and could eventually cost $100 billion to clean 
up,65 resulted in major amendments when CERCLA was re-authorized by 
the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (“SARA”). Reasons 
for the amendments were to strengthen the legislation and the Superfund 
program and to rebuild public confidence.66 Thus, CERCLA became even 
more stringent. A key change made by SARA was a bar against review of a 
PRP’s liability until the EPA brings a judicial action to enforce an order or 
brings a cost-recovery action.67 That is, a PRP must remediate contamina-
tion before it can argue that it is not liable under CERCLA. The bar codi-
fied judicial practice. When PRPs had challenged their liability prior to the 
EPA having brought such proceedings, courts had  refused to infer a right 
to do so,68 considering that it would frustrate CERCLA’s primary purpose 
of swiftly cleaning up hazardous waste sites if challenges were to be al-
lowed before contamination had been remediated.69  
  
 
 
64 See Patricia Sullivan, Anne Gorsuch Burford Dies; Reagan EPA Adm’r, WASHINGTON 
POST, B06 (July 22, 2004) (Ms Gorsch had “resigned under fire in 1983 during a scandal 
over mismanagement of a $1.6 billion program to clean up hazardous waste dumps”). 
65 See H.R. Rep. No. 253(I), 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 55, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
2835, 2837, reprinted in 3 Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, A 
Legislative History of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 
(Public Law 99-499), 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 1764, 1818 (committee print 1990, 7 
volumes). 
66 Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 
(1986). 
67 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) (2012); see In re Combustion Equip. Assocs., Inc., 838 F.2d 35, 41 
(2d Cir. 1988) (declining to exercise jurisdiction under Declaratory Judgment Act to 
declare CERCLA claim dischargeable in bankruptcy). 
68 E.g., United States v. Outboard Marine Corp., 789 F.2d 497, 506 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. 
denied, 479 U.S. 961 (1986) (“CERCLA does not give . . . federal Courts jurisdiction to 
review the EPA's [actions] prior to enforcement. Rather, these courts have held that the 
jurisdiction rests with the trial court only after the EPA has enforced [CERCLA] and the 
Gov’t subsequently sues under CERCLA . . .  to recover the cleanup costs incurred”). 
69 E.g., Dickerson v. Adm’r, EPA, 834 F.2d 974, 978 (11th Cir. 1987) (quoting J.V. Peters 
& Co., Inc., v. Adm’r, EPA, 767 F.2d 263, 264 (6th Cir. 1985)) (“purpose of CERCLA 
provides further evidence that Congress did not intend to provide for pre-enforcement 
judicial review. The primary purpose of CERCLA is ‘the prompt cleanup of hazardous 
waste sites’”). Id. at 978 (quoting Lone Pine Steering Comm. v. EPA, 777 F.2d 882, 886 
(3d Cir. 1985) ("‘[t]o delay remedial action until the liability situation is unscrambled 
would be inconsistent with the statutory plan to promptly eliminate the sources of danger 
to health and environment’"), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1115 (1986)). PRPs may apply for 
recovery of their costs, 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b) (2) (A) (2012), but succeed only infrequently. 
SARA also specifically authorized PRPs to bring contribution actions against other PRPs. 
42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1); see Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 
162-63 (2004). 
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B. Part 2A of the Environmental Protection Act 1990 
In contrast to CERCLA, Part 2A is an enforcement-unfriendly regime 
which, as described below, is not designed to result in the swift remedia-
tion of contaminated sites even though the U.K. Government specifically 
stated that Part 2A is based on the polluter pays principle.70 By the time 
Part 2A received the Royal Assent on 19 July 1995, the principle had been 
an integral part of environmental law for over 20 years and was part of the 
E.U. Treaty.71 Inclusion of the principle in the Treaty, however, is directed 
at institutions of the European Union; Member States are not bound by 
it.72 Further, Part 2A is national, not E.U., legislation.  Still further, the pol-
luter pays principle in Part 2A differs significantly from that of the OECD 
and the European Union.73 
 
 
70 Department of the Environment and the Welsh Office, Paying for Our Past (Mar. 8, 
1994), ¶ 4E.1 (“polluter pays principle must be central to any regulatory regime”) 
[hereinafter Paying for Our Past]. 
71 Consolidated Treaty of the European Union art. 130r (2). The polluter pays principle is, 
together with the preventive and precautionary principles, in the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the EU (“TFEU”), art. 191(2).  Article 191(2) provides: “Union policy on 
the environment shall aim at a high level of protection taking into account the diversity of 
situations in the various regions of the Union. It shall be based on the precautionary 
principle and on the principles that preventive action should be taken, that environmental 
damage should as a priority be rectified at source and that the polluter should pay.” 
72 See Envtl. Prot. Agency v. Neiphin Trading Ltd., [2011] I.E.H.C. 67 ¶ 6.28 (Ir.) 
(agreeing with LUDWIG KRẦMER, FOCUS ON EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 246 (1992), 
that the polluter pays principle “merely set forth principles for action by the European 
Community, or Union as it is now, but they do not themselves have any significant or 
even indirect legal effect”); see R. v. Sec’y of State for Trade and Industry ex parte 
Duddridge, [1996] ENVTL. L. REV. 325 (Court of Appeal) (agreeing Sec’y of State did not 
have duty to apply precautionary principle due to its inclusion in EU Treaty). The EU has 
applied the principle in the Environmental Liability Directive (“ELD”) in which the 
principle has retained its economic origins in its application to liability for remediating 
accidental environmental damage. Directive 2004/35/CE on environmental liability with 
regard to the prevention and remedying of environmental damage, as amended, 2004, O.J. 
(L 143), 56; see also Valerie Fogleman, The Polluter Pays Principle for Accidental 
Environmental Damage; Its Implementation in the Environmental Liability Directive 116, 
128-47, in PRINCIPI EUROPEI E ILLECITO AMBIENTALE (Alessandro D’Adda et al. eds., 
2013). The ELD does not, however, apply to environmental damage that occurred before 
its deadline for transposition into Member State national law on 30 April 2007. ELD, art.  
17; see Joined Cases C-379/08 & C-380/08, Raffinerie Mediterranee SpA (ERG) v. 
Ministero dello Sviluppo Economico, 2010 E.C.R. I-01919, ¶ 34. 
73 See Blanca Mamutse & Valerie Fogleman, Improving the Treatment of Environmental 
Claims in Insolvency, [2013] J.B.L. 486, 497-99 (discussing differences in application of 
polluter pays principle). The U.K. Government’s attitude towards the polluter pays 
principle differed according to whether it was being introduced in E.U. or national 
legislation. In 1993, a Select Committee of the House of Lords referred to the principle as 
having been developed in the E.U. “on the perceived equity of requiring those whose 
activities cause damage to pay for rectifying it”. Select Committee on the European 
Communities, Remedying Environmental Damage, Third Report, 1993-94, H.L., Paper 10 
(Dec. 14, 1993), 5, ¶ 2. The committee considered that it was “quickly apparent that [it 
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Unlike CERCLA, Part 2A was not intended to establish a national 
program to remediate contaminated land.74 Its main objective is “to pro-
vide an improved system for the identification and remediation of land 
where contamination is causing unacceptable risks to human health or the 
wider environment . . . .”75 The primary authorities that implement and 
enforce Part 2A are nearly 450 local authorities, not the national environ-
mental authorities for England, Wales, and Scotland.76 Unlike CERCLA, 
an enforcing authority’s discretion is strictly limited.77 After the local au-
thority in whose area the contaminated site is located makes a determina-
tion that the land meets the criteria for designation as “contaminated 
land,”78  it faces nine prohibitions on the service of a remediation notice79 
and 23 grounds of appeal against it.80 
To be liable under Part 2A, a person must be an “appropriate per-
son.”81 The word “person” is defined broadly, as in CERCLA, to include 
“a body of persons corporate or unincorporated”82 and governmental au-
thorities.83 There are two categories of appropriate persons. Class A per-
sons, who are primarily liable, are persons that “caused or knowingly per-
mitted” a substance to be in, on or under land such that the land is con-
 
 
provides] no more than general indications to what might be desirable policy and 
practice.” Id. at 6, ¶ 4. 
74 See Defra, Assessing Risks from Land Contamination – A Proportionate Approach, Soil 
Guideline Values: The Way Forward (CLAN 6/06, Nov. 2006) 6, ¶ 2.6 (“Part 2A was 
never intended to establish a national remediation program”). 
75 Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions, DETR Circular 02/2000, 
Environmental Protection Act 1990: Part IIA, Contaminated Land (Mar. 20, 2000), annex 
1, ¶ 25. 
76 The Environment Agency, Natural Resources Wales and the Scottish Environment 
Protection Agency are the authorities for a sub-set of contaminated land known as special 
sites. Their authority is, however, severely limited. See Valerie Fogleman, The 
Contaminated Land Regime; Time for a Regime that is Fit for Purpose (Part 1), INT’L J. 
L. IN BUILT ENV’T (forthcoming). 
77 See Valerie Fogleman, The Contaminated Land Regime; Time for a Regime that is Fit 
for Purpose (Part 2), INT’L J. L. IN BUILT ENV’T (forthcoming). 
78 EPA 1990, § 78B. 
79 Id. § 78H. A remediation notice is served if the appropriate person does not voluntarily 
remediate the contamination. If the appropriate person remediates the contamination vol-
untarily, the appropriate person prepares and publishes a remediation statement. EPA § 
78H (7). 
80 Contaminated Land (England) Regulations 2006, S.I. 2006/1380, reg. 7. Whilst there is 
an argument that the grounds of appeal could be seen as protecting the enforcing authority 
from many challenges, this argument is simply wrong. Extensive research into regimes to 
remediate contamination around the world has not found another regime that is as pre-
scribed as Part 2A. 
81 EPA 1990, § 78A (9). 
82 Interpretation Act 1978, c. 30, sched. 1. 
83 EPA 1990, § 159(1). Governmental authorities includes local authorities themselves. 
See id. § 78H (5) (prohibiting service of a remediation notice on a “person if and so long 
as . . . it appears to the [enforcing] authority that the person on whom the notice would be 
served is the authority itself”). 
Environmental Claims and Insolvent Companies 
597 
taminated land.84 Causing contamination is strict liability.85 Liability for 
knowingly permitting contamination occurs when a person who has the 
power to remediate it fails to do so after a reasonable opportunity.86 Part 
2A thus imposes strict liability to a more limited extent than CERCLA. 
Class A persons are considered to be “polluters.”87 If a Class A person 
cannot be found after a reasonable inquiry, the owner or occupier (called a 
Class B person) is secondarily liable.88 Thus, unlike CERCLA, current 
owners and occupiers are secondarily, not primarily, liable although, un-
like CERCLA, there is no “innocent purchaser defense,”89 by which a cur-
rent owner or occupier can avoid liability. Instead, an enforcing authority 
may, but is not required to, apply hardship provisions.90  
Another key difference between the regimes is the scope of liability. 
Part 2A applies joint and several liability to exclude specified appropriate 
persons from liability,91 with the person(s) who remain being liable in re-
 
 
84 Id. § 78F (2). 
85 Alphacell v. Woodward [1972] A.C. 824, 839-41 (H.L.) (Eng.) (overflow from settling 
tanks into river due to brambles, ferns and long leaves becoming wrapped around impel-
lers is act that subjects its operator to liability); see Env’t Agency (formerly National 
Rivers Authority) v. Empress Car Company (Abertillery) Ltd. [1999] 2 A.C. 22, 32 
[1998] 2 W.L.R.  350 (H.L.) (Eng.) (maintaining tank is affirmative act that subjects its 
operator to liability if tank is vandalised and its leaked contents pollute water). 
86 7 Mar. 1995, Parl. Deb., H.L. (1995), vol. 562, col. 182 (U.K.) (statement of Viscount 
Ullswater) (“case law already provides that the test of ‘knowingly permit’ requires both 
knowledge of the contaminating substances and that it must be within a person’s power to 
do something to prevent the pollution occurring”); 11 July 1995, Parl. Deb. H.L. (1995), 
vol. 565, col. 1497 (statement of Earl Ferrers) (“test of ‘knowingly permitting’ would 
require both knowledge that the substances in question were in, on or under the land and 
the possession of the power to prevent such a substance being there”). The person does 
not need to know of the harm that may result from the contamination; only its presence. 
See Circular Facilities (London) Ltd v. Sevenoaks Dist. Council, [2005] EWHC 865, 
[2005] ENV. L. REV. 755, 765 (Q.B.D. Admin.) (Eng.); see generally Valerie Fogleman, 
Circular Facilities (London) Ltd v Sevenoaks DC: The Meaning of “Knowingly 
Permitted” under the Contaminated Land Regime, [2005] J.P.L. 1269. 
87 Department of the Environment and Welsh Office, Framework for Contaminated Land; 
Outcome of the Gov’t’s Policy Review and Conclusions from the Consultation Paper 
Paying for our Past, 4.4.1 (Nov. 1994) (referring to causer or knowing permitter as 
“polluter”). 
88 EPA 1990, § 78F (4). 
89 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35) (A) (2012). A PRP has a defense if it proves that when it 
“acquired the facility the [PRP] did not know and had no reason to know that any 
hazardous substance which is the subject of the release or threatened release was disposed 
of on, in, or at the facility.” Id. § 9601(35) (a) (i). This is accomplished by carrying out 
“all appropriate inquiries.” See All Appropriate Inquiries, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 
AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/brownfields/aai/ (last updated Apr. 10, 2011). 
90 Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, Environmental Protection Act 
1990: Part 2A; Contaminated Land Statutory Guidance, ¶ 8.6(i) (Apr. 2012). CERCLA 
also includes hardship provisions. See 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g) (7) (2012). 
91 Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, Environmental Protection Act 
1990: Part 2A; Contaminated Land Statutory Guidance, ¶¶ 7.38-.61 (Apr. 2012). 
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spect of contamination caused or knowingly permitted by themselves and 
the excluded persons. Part 2A then applies proportionate liability to appor-
tion92 and attribute93 liability between remaining appropriate persons.94 
The detailed exclusion tests for Class A persons are designed to transfer 
liability from the person who actually caused the contamination to the per-
son who most recently knowingly permitted its continued presence.95 Thus, 
in stark contrast to CERCLA, the person who caused contamination can 
be excluded from liability. The U.K. Government considered that excluding 
the actual polluter complies with the polluter pays principle,96 specifically 
referring to the potential for the person who caused the contamination to 
be insolvent or incapable of being identified.97  
Unlike CERCLA, Part 2A includes provisions to protect insolvency 
practitioners from personal98 and criminal liability,99 with an exception if 
they commit an “unreasonable” act or omission. In enacting Part 2A, how-
ever, Parliament did not attempt to reconcile Part 2A with the Insolvency 
Act 1986 (“IA 1986”) or to minimize potential conflicts if claims involving 
Part 2A arise in insolvency proceedings.  
A further major difference between Part 2A and CERCLA is the ab-
sence of a fund in the former. The U.K. Government reasoned that local 
authorities were merely continuing their previous responsibilities under the 
 
 
92 Id. ¶¶ 7.80-7.86. 
93 Id. ¶¶ 7.87-7.91. 
94 See Id. ¶¶ 7.62-.75 (apportionment for Class A persons); id. ¶¶ 8.80-.86 (apportionment 
for Class B persons); id. ¶¶ 8.87-.91 (attribution criteria). 
95 See Fogleman, supra note 77. 
96 See Paying for Our Past, supra note 70, at ¶ 4E.7 (“It need not be inconsistent with the 
[polluter pays principle] to provide for the enforcement of regulatory obligations on 
[persons other than the ‘actual polluter’], especially the owner. The regulator should be 
able to seek to enforce obligations on the person responsible for the pollution or on 
anyone to whom the polluter has transferred the burden of meeting the obligations 
however that transfer took place”); Response to the Communication from the Commission 
of the European Communities (COM (93) 47 final) Green Paper on remedying 
environmental damage; Memorandum by the Government of the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland (Oct., 8 1993) § 3.14 (“The polluter pays principle 
suggests that the polluter should generally meet the costs of remedying damage which is 
attributable to its actions. However, in the normal working of markets in property, 
responsibility for land, and for the effects of that land on others and the surrounding 
environment, shifts with the transfer of ownership. … Provided that residual liability is 
properly reflected in price, liability based on current ownership may still be consistent 
with the polluter pays principle”). 
97 Paying for Our Past, supra note 70, at ¶ 4E.4. 
98 EPA 1990, § 78X (4) (a). The EPA 1990 defines the relevant insolvency practitioners. 
Id. §.78X (3) (a). 
99 Id. § 78X (4) (b). An “unreasonable” act or omission is one that would be considered 
unreasonable by a person acting in the same capacity as the insolvency practitioner. Id. § 
78X (4) (a). 
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statutory nuisance regime.100 Although funding for capital works was sub-
sequently provided, local authorities must bid for it; it is not automatically 
available.101 Further, unlike CERCLA, there is no urgency to remediate 
contamination in Part 2A. Remediation notices may be appealed before 
any remediation begins and are automatically suspended during its ap-
peal.102  Unlike other U.K. regimes, the suspension has no exceptions; it is 
absolute.103 
Still further, courts in the United Kingdom have not construed the 
provisions of Part 2A broadly. There are only three reported cases, two of 
which have been unsympathetic to enforcing authorities. In the first case, 
the High Court allowed an appeal against a remediation notice on the basis 
that the Magistrates Court had failed to state, in its judgment, that it had 
made a finding that the appellant, a developer, had known about the con-
tamination it had purportedly “knowingly permitted.”104 The case involved 
a former brick and tile works that had been re-developed for housing. Car-
bon dioxide and methane from decomposing vegetation in the former clay 
pits was entering the houses, posing a risk of asphyxiation of the residents 
and an explosion. Although the developer had not caused the presence of 
the vegetation, it had failed to remove it during the re-development of the 
site. The issue was, thus, whether the developer knowingly permitter the 
contaminants to remain on the site. 
In the second case, the then House of Lords concluded that the privat-
ized gas company was not a “polluter” and was not liable for remediating 
a former gasworks site that had been redeveloped as housing. The contam-
ination was found when a resident of one of the houses “discovered a pit 
 
 
100 11 July 1995, Parl. Deb. (1995) H.L., vol. 565, col. 1501; see also Environment 
Committee, Contaminated Land, Report, H.C. (1996-97), 22-II, Memorandum by 
Department of the Environment, 2, ¶ 14 (responsibilities under statutory nuisance regime 
are “broadly equivalent to those under Part IIA to cause their areas to be inspected from 
time to time, and to require action to deal with various matters including premises or 
deposits which are prejudicial to health or a nuisance”). 
101 See, e.g., Environment Agency, Contaminated Land Program; Approved Projects for 
2012/13, 1 (Aug. 2012); Environment Agency, Contaminated Land Capital Projects 
Outcomes Report 2011-12 (Dec. 2012). 
102 Contaminated Land (England) Regulations 2006, S.I. 2006/1380, reg. 12(1); see 
Housing on Chemicals Site Contaminated Land, 329 ENDS Rep. 3 (2002); Redland and 
Crest to Start Site Clean-up, 422 ENDS Rep. 23 (Mar. 2010) (remediation of 
contamination began 10 years after discovery of site due to length process in determining 
land to be contaminated land, serving remediation notices and finalisation of appeal 
against notices).  
103 Cf. Statutory Nuisance (Appeals) Regulations 1995, S.I. 1995/2644, reg. 3 (Eng.) 
(exceptions include alleged statutory nuisance being injurious to health); Anti-Pollution 
Works Regulations 1996, S.I. 1996/1006 (Eng. & Wales) (no provisions for suspension of 
works notices). 
104 Circular Facilities (London) Ltd v. Sevenoaks Dist. Council, [2005] EWHC 865, 
[2005] ENV. L. REV. 755, 764 (Q.B.D. Admin.) (Eng.). 
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filled with a tar-like substance in his garden.”105 The developers of the 
housing on the former gasworks, which had been in operation before Brit-
ish Gas was nationalized in 1948, had been dissolved many years before 
the discovery. Lord Scott stated that he had “no doubt that that [Part 2A 
was enacted on the principle that the polluter should pay] and [had] no 
quarrel with that principle. But [the privatized gas company] was not a 
polluter and is no less innocent of having ‘caused or knowingly permitted’ 
the pollution than the innocent owner or occupiers of the 11 residences.”106 
He was scathing about the Environment Agency’s contention that the pri-
vatized company should be liable, stating that he found 
it extraordinary and unacceptable that a public authority, a part of govern-
ment, should seek to impose a liability on a private company, and thereby to 
reduce the value of the investment held by its shareholders, that falsifies the 
basis on which the original investors, the subscribers, were invited by gov-
ernment to subscribe for shares.107 
Finally, in contrast to the U.S. Congress strengthening CERCLA six 
years after its enactment, the U.K. Government weakened Part 2A in 2012 
by, among other things, directing enforcing authorities to “seek to use Part 
2A only where no appropriate alternative solution exists.”108  
IV. ENVIRONMENTAL CLAIMS IN BANKRUPTCY / INSOLVENCY 
PROCEEDINGS 
The clashes between bankruptcy law and environmental law in the Unit-
ed States began much earlier than in the United Kingdom. As a result, there 
are many more cases on many more issues in the United States. This section 
examines two key issues; discharging liability for clean-up costs in a re-
organization, and disclaiming property in a bankruptcy/insolvency estate as 
burdensome/onerous property. The first issue shows the resourcefulness of the 
EPA in bringing proceedings that survive re-organization, an issue which has 
not yet arisen in the United Kingdom. The second issue shows major differ-
ences in the approaches by courts in the United States and the United King-
dom. 
A. Environmental claims in bankruptcy proceedings in the United 
States 
Most environmental claims in bankruptcy proceedings in the United 
States involve CERCLA, so-called State mini-CERCLAs (that is, similar 
legislation to CERCLA enacted by State legislatures), and to a lesser extent 
 
 
105 R. (National Grid Gas PLC) v. Env’t Agency,[2006] EWHC 1083 (Admin), [2006] 1 
W.L.R. 3041, ¶ 33 (Q.B.D.) (Eng.). 
106 R. (National Grid Gas PLC) v. Env’t Agency, [2007] UKHL 30, [2007] 1 W.L.R. 
1780, 1786 (H.L) (Eng.). 
107 Id. at 1786-87. 
108 Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, Environmental Protection Act 
1990: Part 2A; Contaminated Land Statutory Guidance, ¶ 1.5 (Apr. 2012). 
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RCRA. The clashes between environmental and bankruptcy law were inev-
itable. The U.S. Congress did not consider the interface with bankruptcy 
law when it enacted CERCLA or RCRA. In particular, the bar against liti-
gation by a PRP under CERCLA until the EPA has brought judicial pro-
ceedings is in direct conflict with the purpose of the Bankruptcy Code to 
administer a debtor’s estate swiftly, distribute whatever assets remain fairly 
among creditors, and provide debtors with a fresh start109 by discharging 
debts that arose before the bankruptcy.110 The clash is made even more 
difficult because, in addition to environmental law (which may be federal 
or state law) and bankruptcy law (which is federal law), doctrines of cor-
porate/company law (which is state law) are generally involved.111  The 
different approaches of CERCLA and bankruptcy law have, as one judge 
remarked, led creditors to be “stranded at the increasingly crowded ‘inter-
section’ between the discordant legislative approaches embodied in 
CERCLA and the Bankruptcy Code.”112 
 
 
109 See, e.g., In re Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific R.R., 974 F.2d 775, 779 (7th 
Cir. 1992) ("CERCLA and the Bankruptcy Act are two sweeping statutes both with very 
important purposes. The problem is that the goals underlying these statutes do not always 
coincide. Bankruptcy laws serve an important purpose of equitably distributing an 
insolvent debtor's funds in hopes of maximizing the creditor's interests in receiving 
payment and the debtor's interest in a fresh start. . . . Just as important interests underlie 
the bankruptcy laws, laudable goals also underlie CERCLA — namely, protecting this 
nation's environment by distributing the costs associated with cleaning up sites containing 
hazardous materials."); In re Chateaugay Corp., 944 F.2d 997, 1002 (2d Cir. 1991). ("We 
agree that the Bankruptcy Code and CERCLA point toward competing objectives. The 
Code aims to provide reorganized debtors with a fresh start, an objective made more 
feasible by maximizing the scope of a discharge. CERCLA aims to clean up 
environmental damage, an objective that the enforcement agencies in this litigation 
contend will be better served if their entitlement to be reimbursed for CERCLA response 
costs based on pre-petition pollution is not considered to be a "claim" and instead may be 
asserted at full value against the reorganized corporation."); In re Hemingway Transport, 
Inc., 993 F.2d 915, 921 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 914 (1993) (“CERCLA's settled 
policy objectives, reemphasized in [SARA], prominently include the expeditious cleanup 
of sites contaminated or threatened by hazardous substance releases which jeopardize 
public health and safety, and the equitable allocation of cleanup costs among all [PRPs]. . 
. . On the other hand, [the] Bankruptcy Code . . . often serves to forestall CERCLA's 
intended equitable allocation of responsibility."). 
110 See Pierre G. Armand, Steven D. Cook, M. Natasha Labovitz & David F. Williams, 
Current Hot Topics Involving Litigation of Environmental Issues in Large Corporate 
Bankruptcies (ABA Section of Litigation 2011 Environmental, Mass Torts & Products 
Liability Committees Joint CLE Seminar).(Jan. 27-29, 2011): Environmental Litigation 
Breakout: Caution at the Intersection of Environmental and Bankruptcy Law 1. 
111 See Anne M. Lawton & Lynda J. Oswald, Scary Stories and the Limited Liability 
Polluter in Chapter 11, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 451, 459 (2008).  
112 In re Hemingway Transp., Inc., 993 F.2d 915, 921 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 
914 (1993) (“CERCLA's settled policy objectives, reemphasized in the Superfund 
Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (‘SARA’), prominently include the 
expeditious clean-up of sites contaminated or threatened by hazardous substance releases 
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i. Discharging liabilities for clean-up costs in a re-organization 
A major clash involves the discharge of liabilities for clean-up costs in 
a re-organization under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. With limited 
exceptions, a debtor in a chapter 11 re-organization discharges pre-petition 
debts.113 The Bankruptcy Code defines a “debt” as “liability on a claim,”114 
and a “claim” as a “right to payment”115 or “a right to an equitable reme-
dy for breach of performance if such breach gives rise to a right to pay-
ment.”116  
The landmark case as to whether a claim for remediating contamina-
tion is a “claim” under the Bankruptcy Code is Ohio v. Kovacs.117 In 1976, 
the State of Ohio had brought an action against Kovacs, the chief executive 
officer of Chem-Dyne Corporation, as well as Chem-Dyne which operated 
a hazardous waste disposal site, for breaching environmental laws. In set-
tling the action, Kovacs agreed, on behalf of himself and Chem-Dyne, to an 
injunction that, among other things, prohibited further pollution, barred 
further waste being brought onto the site, and required the removal of haz-
ardous waste from the site. When Kovacs failed to remove the waste, the 
State of Ohio had appointed a receiver, who was directed to take posses-
sion of the site and Kovacs’ other assets so as to comply with the injunc-
tion. Before the clean-up was complete, Kovacs filed a bankruptcy peti-
tion.118 The State filed a complaint in the Bankruptcy Court that Kovacs’ 
obligations were not dischargeable in bankruptcy because they were not a 
“debt.”119  
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed with the Sixth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals that Kovacs’ obligations were dischargeable in bankruptcy because 
they had been converted into an obligation to pay money and were, there-
fore, a “claim” under the Bankruptcy Code.120 The Court noted that it was 
not holding that the parts of the injunction prohibiting pollution and bar-
ring further waste being brought to the site were dischargeable in bank-
ruptcy. In addition, the Court stated that it was not questioning whether 
 
 
which jeopardize public health and safety, and the equitable allocation of clean up costs 
among all [PRPs]”). 
113 See 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d) (1) (A) (2012) (confirmation of plan of re-organization 
“discharges the debtor from any debt that arose before the date of such confirmation”). 
114 11 U.S.C. § 101(12) (2012). 
115 Id. § 101(5)(A) (“right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, 
liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, 
legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured”). 
116 Id. § 101(5)(B) (“right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach 
gives rise to a right to payment, whether or not such right to an equitable remedy is 
reduced to judgment, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, 
secured, or unsecured”). 
117 469 U.S. 274 (1985). 
118 Id. at 276. 
119 Id. at 276-77. 
120 Id. at 285. 
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anyone “in possession of the site – whether it is Kovacs or another in the 
event the receivership is liquidated and the trustee abandons the property, 
or a vendee from the receiver or the bankruptcy trustee – must comply 
with the environmental laws.”121 
Due to the issue not being fully resolved, many cases followed as to 
whether an action to clean up contamination against a PRP under 
CERCLA or equivalent persons under State mini-CERCLAs is dischargea-
ble in bankruptcy. In In re Chateaugay Corp., the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals held that a debtor may discharge a claim for reimbursement of the 
cost of cleaning up contamination.122 The court discussed difficulties in 
making such a decision, commenting that the intent of the Bankruptcy 
Code is “to override many provisions of law that would apply in the ab-
sence of bankruptcy,”123 and noting that “an order to clean up a site, to the 
extent that it imposes obligations distinct from any obligation to stop or 
ameliorate ongoing pollution, is a ‘claim’ if the creditor obtaining the order 
[usually the EPA] had the option, which CERCLA confers, to do the clean-
up work itself and sue for response costs, thereby converting the injunction 
into a monetary obligation.”124 Thus, according to the Second Circuit, 
most claims under CERCLA are dischargeable in bankruptcy with the ex-
ception of an EPA order for cleaning up ongoing contamination that met 
the “imminent and substantial endangerment” criteria under CERCLA.125 
It thus seemed that the EPA was bound to failure in bringing many 
claims for clean ups against PRPs, who could then re-organize minus the 
claims. The EPA, however, eventually found the solution in a case involv-
ing Apex Oil Company. Apex had bought a refinery in Hartford, Illinois, 
in 1967. In 1987, it filed for re-organization under chapter 11. In 1990, 
Apex emerged from re-organization, having discharged its obligations. The 
EPA did not bring a claim in the re-organization proceedings. The re-
organized company no longer refined oil due to its predecessor having sold 
the refinery in 1988. In 2003, the EPA exercised its powers under 
CERCLA and the Clean Water Act to investigate a plume of hydrocarbons 
migrating from the refinery. The hydrocarbons had contaminated the shal-
low groundwater and were emitting fumes into residences, posing a risk to 
human health and the environment. Apex refused to contribute to the clean 
 
 
121 Id. at 283. 
122 944 F.2d 997, 1009 (2d Cir. 1991). 
123 Id. at 1002. 
124 Id. at 1008. 
125 See, e.g., In re CMC Heartland Partners, 966 F.2d 1143, 1146-47 (7th Cir. 1992) 
(“CERCLA postpones all judicial review of administrative orders under § 106(a) until the 
work has been performed or the EPA itself applies for judicial enforcement”); see 42 
U.S.C. § 9606(a) (2012) (when EPA “determines that there may be an imminent and 
substantial endangerment to the public health or welfare or the environment because of an 
actual or threatened release of a hazardous substance from a facility, he may require the 
Attorney General of the United States to secure such relief as may be necessary to abate 
such danger or threat”). 
2 Br. J. Am. Leg. Studies (2013) 
604 
up. Its contribution was estimated at $150 million, although it may have 
been able to recover some of this amount by bringing contribution actions 
against other PRPs. The EPA notified Apex that it would carry out the re-
mediation itself and seek contribution from Apex under CERCLA and the 
Clean Water Act. 
Instead, the EPA brought an action against Apex under RCRA. In 
contrast to CERCLA, RCRA does not include a provision that authorizes 
any kind of monetary relief. RCRA entitles a plaintiff, including the EPA, 
only to demand a cleanup.126 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reject-
ed Apex’s argument that the claim was monetary because it would have to 
pay a contractor to remediate the contamination because it no longer had 
internal capacity to carry out the works itself. The court stated that “[t]he 
root arbitrariness of Apex’s position is that whether a polluter can clean up 
his pollution himself or has to hire someone to do it has no relevance to the 
policy of either the Bankruptcy Code or [RCRA].”127 The court also reject-
ed Apex’s argument that, if it had known in 1986 when it declared bank-
ruptcy that it could be liable for $150 million in clean-up costs, it would 
have liquidated instead of re-organized.128 Apex thus remained liable for 
remediating the contamination even though it no longer owned or operated 
the refinery. 
The  question whether remediation orders constitute “claims” in in-
solvency proceedings has more recently been considered by the Supreme 
Court of Canada in Newfoundland & Labrador v. AbitibiBowater, Inc.129 
AbitibiBowater, Inc. (“Abitibi”), a financially distressed company which 
had been involved in industrial activity in the Newfoundland and Labrador 
Province, obtained a stay of proceedings under the Companies’ Creditors 
Arrangement Act (“CCAA”).130  Some months later, orders under the Envi-
ronmental Protection Act131 (“EPA Orders”) were issued, by virtue of 
which Abitibi was required to carry out remediation activities. The en-
forceability of the EPA Orders depended on their falling outside the CCAA 
definition of “claims” subject to the claims process, on the basis that they 
 
 
126 See 42 U.S.C. § 6973(a) (2012) (“upon receipt of evidence that the past or present 
handling, storage, treatment, transportation or disposal of any solid waste or hazardous 
waste may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the 
environment, the[EPA] may bring suit on behalf of the United States in the appropriate 
district court against any person (including any past or present generator, past or present 
transporter, or past or present owner or operator of a treatment, storage, or disposal 
facility) who has contributed or who is contributing to such handling, storage, treatment, 
transportation or disposal to restrain such person from such handling, storage, treatment, 
transportation, or disposal, to order such person to take such other action as may be 
necessary, or both”). 
127 United States v. Apex Oil Co., 579 F.3d 734, 736-37 (7th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 131 
S. Ct. 67 (2010). 
128 Id. 
129 2012 SCC 67 (Can.). 
130 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 (Can.). 
131 S.N.L. 2002, c. E-142 (Can.). 
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were non-monetary statutory obligations.132 Treating the EPA Orders as 
claims would enable Abitibi to emerge from the CCAA restructuring “free 
of the obligation, able to recommence business without remediating the 
properties it polluted, the cost of which would fall on the Newfoundland 
and Labrador public.”133 On the other hand, as regulatory orders, they 
would “remain in effect until the property has been cleaned up or the mat-
ter otherwise resolved,” thereby surviving the company’s restructuring.134 
The “distinction between regulatory obligations under the general law 
aimed at the protection of the public and monetary claims that can be 
compromised in CCAA restructuring or bankruptcy” was therefore fun-
damental,135 more specifically the question at what point a regulatory obli-
gation arising from environmental protection legislation could be recog-
nized as a claim capable of being proved or compromised under the 
CCAA. 
The Supreme Court found that the requirements for a provable claim 
were satisfied insofar as there was a debt, liability or obligation owed to 
the Province, which had identified itself as a creditor by exercising its en-
forcement power against Abitibi, and the environmental damage had oc-
curred before the commencement of the CCAA proceedings.136 The third 
element, “that it be possible to attach a monetary value to the obligation,” 
necessitated a consideration of the question whether “orders that are not 
expressed in monetary terms can be translated into such terms.”137 Where 
there were sufficient indications and certainty that the regulatory body 
which triggered the enforcement mechanism would “ultimately perform 
remediation work and assert a monetary claim to have its costs reim-
bursed,” the court would find that an EPA Order was subject to the insol-
vency process.138 The court was unpersuaded by the argument that classing 
a regulatory order as a claim would undermine the polluter pays principle 
by extinguishing Abitibi’s environmental obligations: 
This objection demonstrates a misunderstanding of the nature of insolven-
cy proceedings. Subjecting an order to the claims process does not extin-
guish the debtor’s environmental obligations any more than subjecting any 
creditor’s claim to that process extinguishes the debtor’s obligation to pay 
its debts. It merely ensures that the creditor’s claim will be paid in accord-
ance with insolvency legislation.  Moreover, full compliance with orders 
that are found to be monetary in nature would shift the costs of remedia-
tion to third-party creditors, including involuntary creditors, such as those 
whose claims lie in tort or in the law of extra-contractual liability. In the 
insolvency context, the Province’s position would result not only in a su-
 
 
132 2012 SCC 67, ¶¶ 10-11, 14-15. 
133 Id. ¶ 64. 
134 Id. ¶ ¶ 71-72. 
135 Id. ¶ 74. 
136 Id. ¶ ¶ 26-29. 
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138 Id. ¶ 36. 
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per-priority, but in the acceptance of a “third-party-pay” principle in place 
of the polluter-pay principle. 
Nor does subjecting the orders to the insolvency process amount to issuing 
a license to pollute, since insolvency proceedings do not concern the debt-
or’s future conduct. A debtor that is reorganized must comply with all en-
vironmental regulations going forward in the same way as any other per-
son. To quote the colorful analogy of two American scholars, “Debtors in 
bankruptcy have — and should have — no greater license to pollute in vi-
olation of a statute than they have to sell cocaine in violation of a stat-
ute.”139 
Furthermore, corporations may engage in activities that carry risks. No 
matter what risks are at issue, reorganization made necessary by insolven-
cy is hardly ever a deliberate choice. When the risks materialize, the dire 
costs are borne by almost all stakeholders. To subject orders to the claims 
process is not to invite corporations to restructure in order to rid them-
selves of their environmental liabilities.140 
The court concluded that an environmental order issued by a regula-
tory body was capable of being treated as a contingent claim and admitted 
to the claims process if there was sufficient certainty that the regulatory 
body would bring a monetary claim against the debtor.141 Having estab-
lished that the Province would remediate the environmental contamination 
itself,142 its claim was one of a monetary nature and the EPA Orders would 
consequently not be exempted143 from the stay of proceedings and eventual 
compromise of claims in Abitibi’s restructuring under the CCAA. 
ii. Abandonment of burdensome property 
The U.S. Bankruptcy Code authorizes a bankruptcy trustee to “aban-
don any property of the estate that is burdensome to the estate or that is of 
inconsequential value and benefit to the estate.”144 The Bankruptcy Code 
does not contain any express exceptions to this power.145 The issue in Mid-
 
 
139 Id. ¶¶ 40-42 (quoting Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Kovacs and Toxic 
Wastes in Bankruptcy, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1199, 1200 (1984)). 
140 Id. ¶ 42. 
141 Id. ¶ 54.  
142 Cf. id. ¶ 86 (McLachlin C.J., dissenting; preferring higher threshold of “likelihood 
approaching certainty” that regulatory body would perform remedial work); id. ¶ 101 
(LeBel J., concurring in finding insufficient evidence the Province would perform 
remedial work itself). 
143 Id. ¶ 62. 
144 11 U.S.C. § 554(a) (2012) (“After notice and a hearing, the trustee may abandon any 
property of the estate that is burdensome to the estate or that is of inconsequential value 
and benefit to the estate”). 
145 Midlantic Nat’l Bank v. New Jersey Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 474 U.S. 494, 509 (1986) 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“section 554(a) is “absolute in its terms [and] suggests that a 
trustee’s power to abandon is limited only by considerations of the property’s value to the 
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lantic National Bank v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protec-
tion146  was whether such a power was nevertheless implicit in the Code. 
The case concerned a company that processed waste oil. The company had 
breached its permit by accepting over 400,000 gallons of oil contaminated 
by polychlorinated biphenyls, leading the New Jersey Department of Envi-
ronmental Protection to order it to cease operating. During negotiations 
between the company and the Department concerning the clean up, the 
company filed a chapter 11 petition for re-organization. After the Depart-
ment issued an order requiring the company to clean up the facility, the 
company converted its chapter 11 proceeding to a chapter 7 liquidation 
proceeding. The bankruptcy trustee subsequently determined that the facil-
ity was a net burden to the bankruptcy estate and, following unsuccessful 
attempts to sell it, notified the court and creditors that he would abandon 
it. The Bankruptcy Court approved the abandonment and subsequently 
approved the trustee’s abandonment of contaminated oil at another facility 
owned by the company. 
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the Bankruptcy Court’s 
decision. The U.S. Supreme Court (in a 5:4 decision), affirmed the Third 
Circuit, stating that “[n]either the Court nor Congress has granted a trus-
tee in bankruptcy powers that would lend support to a right to abandon 
property in contravention of state or local laws designed to protect public 
health or safety.”147 The Court emphasized that the exception from the 
Bankruptcy Code is narrow, commenting that it “does not encompass a 
speculative or indeterminate future violation of such laws that may stem 
from abandonment. The abandonment power is not to be fettered by laws 
or regulations not reasonably calculated to protect the public health or 
safety from imminent and identifiable harm.”148 
Most courts that have subsequently determined the extent of a bank-
ruptcy trustee’s powers to abandon a contaminated site have construed the 
exception narrowly to require imminent and identifiable harm to human 
health.149 Another factor considered by them is the assets in the bankruptcy 
 
 
estate. It makes no mention of other factors to be balanced or weighed and permits no 
easy inference that Congress was concerned about state environmental regulations”). 
146 Id. at 494. 
147 Id. at 502. 
148 Id. at 502, n.9. 
149 See, e.g., In re Smith-Douglass, Inc., 856 F.2d 12, 15 (4th Cir. 1988). The court stated 
that “Not surprisingly, the bankruptcy courts interpreting Midlantic have reached 
inconsistent results. Some courts have determined that the Midlantic exception applies 
only where there is an imminent danger to public health and safety. Id.; see, e.g., In re 
Purco, Inc., 76 B.R.  523, 533 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1987); In re Franklin Signal Corp., 65 
B.R. 268, 271-72 (Bankr. D. Minn.  1986). Other courts have determined that Midlantic 
requires full compliance, prior to abandonment, with the applicable environmental law. 
See In re Peerless Plating Co., 70 B.R. 943, 946-47 n.1 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1987.” Id.; 
see also In re L.F. Jennings Oil Co., 4 F.3d 887, 890 (10th Cir. 1993). (“abundantly clear 
from the record on appeal that [the site] was not, at the time of abandonment, an 
immediate threat to public health or safety”); see also Mary J. Koks & Tim Million, 
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estate, which may be so limited that they would not cover the cost of clean-
ing up contamination even if the bankruptcy trustee was to abandon the 
site.150 
B. Environmental claims in insolvency proceedings in the United 
Kingdom 
The first cases involving environmental claims in insolvency proceed-
ings in the United Kingdom arose, not from Part 2A or other legislation 
requiring the remediation of contamination, but from waste management 
legislation. The issue was whether the liquidator of an insolvency estate 
could disclaim a waste management license as “onerous property” under 
section 178 of the IA 1986. Effective disclaimer facilitates the release of the 
insolvent estate from the burden of unprofitable contracts or unsaleable 
property by terminating the debtor’s rights, interests and liabilities there-
in.151 
These powers are intended to assist the insolvency practitioner to bring 
about the liquidation of the company, without being hampered by proper-
ty or obligations which might be considered a liability, or valueless, and 
which would interfere with distribution of any remaining assets of the 
company to unsecured creditors, once the claims of preferred and secured 
creditors have been met.152 
As shown below, English courts have established that the exercise of 
the disclaimer power is not constrained by provisions in environmental 
legislation governing clean-up obligations or the termination of licenses.153  
The Court of Appeal decided in Re Celtic Extraction that there was 
no basis on which the Waste Framework Directive could be construed to 
find that the polluter pays principle should prevail over unsecured credi-
tors’ interests in  the assets available for distribution .154 The court held 
that that in the absence of clear wording, the statutory inconsistency would 
 
 
Environmental Issues in Bankruptcy, 40 TEX. ENVTL. L.J. 43, 59-62 (2009/2010). 
(discussing majority and minority positions); Ingrid Michelsen Hillinger & Michael G. 
Hillinger, Environmental Affairs in Bankruptcy: 2004, 12 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 331, 
361-72 (2004) (discussing case law on abandonment power). 
150 See, e.g., In re Oklahoma Ref. Co., 63 B.R. 562 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1986) 
(contamination “does not present immediate and menacing harm to public health and 
safety. Moreover, abandonment will not aggravate the existing situation, create a genuine 
emergency nor increase the likelihood of disaster or intensification of polluting agent. . . . 
For all purposes the difference between denying and allowing abandonment produces the 
same result. Under either scenario there are no funds available to finance the closure plan 
or the post-closure monitoring”). 
151 See IA 1986, § 178 (U.K.), and Companies Act 1963, § 290 (Ir.). 
152 Carolyn Shelbourn, Can the Insolvent Polluter Pay? Environmental Licences and the 
Insolvent Company, 12 J. ENVTL. L. 207, 221 (2000). 
153 See, e.g., Waste Management Act 1996, § 58 (Ir.), and EPA 1990, § 35(11) (U.K.). 
154 [1999] 4 All E.R. 684, ¶ 39; see Council Directive 75/442 on waste, art. 15, 1975 O.J. 
(L 194), 39 (repealed). 
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be resolved in favor of a narrow construction of the polluter pays principle, 
to prevent its application “to cases where the polluter cannot pay.”155 This 
decision thus clashes with the interpretation of the Waste Framework Di-
rective by the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”), albeit in a 
different context. The CJEU concluded, in a case involving a claim by a 
governmental authority for clean-up costs against a company that pro-
duced the oil spilled from the Erika off the coast of Brittany, that “whatev-
er system is in place for allocating responsibility for environmental dam-
age, it must ensure that the state is not burdened with the costs.”156 The 
CJEU rejected the reasoning of Advocate General Kokott that liability 
could be shifted to the public, concluding instead that the producer or pre-
vious holder of the waste should be liable if it contributed to the risk that 
pollution would occur.157  
In Re Celtic Extraction, the Court of Appeal concluded that the pow-
er to disclaim a waste management license as “onerous property”158 under 
section 178 of IA 1986 was not restricted by section 35(11) of the EPA 
1990, which provided for waste management licenses to continue in force 
until their revocation or surrender.159 The court distinguished between ter-
mination by act of parties under section 35(11) and the “external statutory 
force” of the disclaimer provision (section 178), ultimately placing “prima-
 
 
155 [1999] 4 All E.R. ¶ 39. 
156 Case C-188/07, Commune de Mesquer v. Total France SA, 2008 E.C.R. I-4501, ¶ 82. 
The Waste Framework Directive provides that “[i]n accordance with the ‘polluter pays’ 
principle, the cost of disposing of waste, less any proceeds derived from treating the 
waste, shall be borne by . . . the holder who has waste handled by a waste collector or by 
an undertaking . . . and/or the previous holders or the producer of the product from which 
the waste came.” Council Directive 75/442 on waste, art. 15, 1975 O.J. (L 194), 39 
(repealed). Article 15 of the revised Waste Framework Directive (Directive 2008/98 on 
waste, 2008 O.J. (L 312), 3) provides that “In accordance with the polluter-pays principle, 
the costs of waste management shall be borne by the original waste producer or by the 
current or previous waste holders. . . . Member States may decide that the costs of waste 
management are to be borne partly or wholly by the producer of the product from which 
the waste came and that the distributors of the produce may share these costs.” The CJEU 
had concluded in an earlier case that holders of waste may be liable regardless of whether 
they produced the waste or possess it when the pollution occurs. Case No. C-1/03, Van de 
Walle v. Texaco Belgium SA, 2004 E.C.R. I-7613, ¶ 57. 
157 See David Hart Q.C. & Rachel Marcus, The Polluter-Pays Principle: Mesquer and the 
New Waste Framework Directive, 6 ENVTL. LIABILITY 195, 198-99 (2008). Liability 
attaches only to the extent that the person was responsible for the pollution. See C-293/97, 
R. v. Sec’y of State (ex parte Standley), 1999 E.C.R. I-02603, ¶ 51 (“As regards the 
polluter pays principle, suffice it to say that the Directive does not mean that farmers must 
take on burdens for the elimination of polluter to which they have not contributed”). 
158 IA 1986, § 178(3) (defined as “(a) any unprofitable contract, and (b) any other 
property of the company which is unsaleable or not readily saleable or is such that it may 
give rise to a liability to pay money or perform any other onerous act”). 
159 [2000] 2 W.L.R. 991, [2001] Ch. 475, 478 (Court of Appeal) (Eng.). 
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cy upon the orderly winding-up of companies in advance of deploying the 
resources available to mitigate environmental harm.”160 
In Re Irish Ispat Ltd.,161 the Irish High Court also considered waste 
legislation in a case involving the imposition of liability for the cost of re-
mediating contamination on a liquidator, with the result that the costs 
would be transferred to the creditors of the estate. That is, the assets of the 
insolvency estate would be used to pay the costs of remediation rather than 
being paid to the creditors. The issue was whether the provisions of the 
Waste Management Act 1996 “should be applied in priority” to the provi-
sions of the Companies Act 1963. The court echoed the view in Re Celtic 
Extraction that the polluter pays principle could not apply to prevent dis-
claimer where the company had no assets.162 Furthermore, the court reject-
ed the suggestion that large shareholder loans owed to Irish Ispat’s parent 
company should be differentiated from other debts “and presumably in 
some way be made amenable to mitigating or remedying pollution” – there 
was no known principle of law which could support the notion of permit-
ting certain debts which had been proved in the winding-up “from benefit-
ing from the pari passu rule and being diverted to another purpose.”163  
However, the experience in similar cases in New Zealand and Austral-
ia shows that different considerations regarding disclaimer can be applied 
to companies which go into voluntary liquidation with sufficient assets to 
discharge their debts. The cases of Tubbs v. Futurity Investments Ltd.164 
and Sullivan v. Energy Services International Pty. Ltd.165 involved unsuc-
cessful attempts to disclaim toxic substances and contaminated waste. The 
courts noted the risk that allowing disclaimer would enable voluntary liq-
uidation to provide a means for companies to avoid their regulatory obli-
gations and “improve the payout to creditors,”166 more so “where the 
 
 
160 See Robert Lee & Tamara Egede, Bank Lending and the Environment: Not Liability 
but Responsibility, 2007 J. BUS. L. 868, 879; see also Carolyn Shelbourn, supra note 152, 
at 218 (notwithstanding that the “restrictions on the transfer or surrender of waste 
management licences had been introduced to ‘prevent problems which had arisen under 
earlier legislation’”). 
161 [2004] I.E.H.C. 278 (Ir.). It should be noted however that the status of the polluter pays 
principle under Irish law is a matter “of some dispute.” See John Ronan & Sons v. Clean 
Build Ltd., [2011] I.E.H.C. 350, ¶ 5.1 (Ir.); see also Environmental Protection Agency v. 
Neiphin Trading Ltd., [2011] I.E.H.C. 67, ¶¶ 6.13-6.48 (Ir.). 
162 Id.  
163 Id. 
164 [1998] 1 NZLR 471 (High Court, Christchurch, NZ). This echoes the view expressed 
in English cases “that a company in financial difficulties may not go into voluntary 
liquidation solely to avoid its environmental liabilities.” Carolyn Shelbourn, supra note 
152, at 225; Re Mineral Resources, [1999] 1 All E.R. 746, 765 (Ch., Companies Court) 
(Eng.); Re Wilmott Trading (Nos. 1 & 2), [1999] 2 B.C.L.C. 541, 544 (Ch., Companies 
Court) (Eng.). 
165 [2002] NSWSC 937 (S. Ct. NSW) (Austl.). 
166 See Tubbs v. Futurity Investments Ltd., [1998] 1 NZLR 471, 479-80 (High Court, 
Christchurch, N.Z.).  
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whole of the evidence strongly suggests a device by those controlling the 
company to avoid liability.”167 In circumstances where sufficient funds are 
available to meet creditor claims, it would therefore seem that the argu-
ments outlined above with respect to the protection of creditors168 apply 
with equal force to efforts by debtor companies to transfer the burden of 
clean-up obligations to the State169 or third parties.170 
Notwithstanding the English authority of Re Celtic Extraction, envi-
ronmental claims in insolvency proceedings are much less likely to involve 
waste management licenses in the future even if a claim was to arise that is 
sufficiently different to distinguish it from that case. Even though there are 
a large number of closed landfills that still have licenses and have not satis-
fied the criteria for surrender of those licenses due to their environmental 
condition,171 landfills operating after July 2001 must make financial provi-
sion to meet closure and post-closure obligations in their permits.172 The 
obligations include a requirement for the financial provision to be main-
tained for at least 30 years from the date on which a landfill is closed in 
order to ensure that funds are available to carry out remediation measures 
in the event that the closed landfill causes pollution or harm to human 
health.173 The Environment Agency has also taken measures to ensure that 
financial provision mechanisms are accessible if a landfill operator becomes 
 
 
167 Sullivan v. Energy Services Intl. Pty. Ltd., [2002] NSWSC 937 (S. Ct. NSW), ¶ 32 
(Austl.). 
168 See Re Celtic Extraction, [2000] 2 W.L.R. 991, [2001] Ch. 475 (Court of Appeal) 
(Eng.); Re Irish Ispat, [2004] I.E.H.C. 278 (Ir.). 
169 Tubbs v. Futurity Investments Ltd., [1998] 1 NZLR 471, 478, 480 (High Court, 
Christchurch (N.Z.). 
170 Sullivan v. Energy Services Int’l Pty. Ltd., [2002] NSWSC 937 (S. Ct. NSW), ¶ 47 
(Austl.). 
171 Approximately 1,500 landfills that were closed, largely because they did not meet the 
more stringent standards introduced by the Landfill Directive, still have licenses. Of these 
closed landfills, 26% are owned by large companies, 75 by local authorities, and 65% by 
small- to medium- sized companies. Approximately half of these landfills pose a high risk 
of polluting groundwater. The Environment Agency has succeeded in persuading the 
owners of only three of them to surrender their licences. See Agency Grapples with 
Closed Landfill Legacy, 434 ENDS Rep. 20-21 (Mar. 28, 2011). 
172 Article 8(a)(iv) of the Landfill Directive provides that “adequate provisions, by way of 
a financial security or any other equivalent, on the basis of modalities to be decided by 
Member States, has been or will be made by the applicant prior to the commencement of 
disposal operations to ensure that the obligations (including after-care provisions) arising 
under the permit issued under the provisions of this Directive are discharged and that the 
closure procedures required by Article 13 are followed. This security or its equivalent 
shall be kept as long as required by maintenance and after-care operation of the site in 
accordance with Article 13(d).” Council Directive 1999/31 on the landfill of waste, 1999 
O.J. (L 182), 1, 7; see Environment Agency, Financial Provision for Landfill ¶ 1.2 (Doc 
No 22_06, Apr. 21, 2011). 
173 Council Directive 1999/31 on the Landfill of Waste, art. 10, 1999 O.J. (L 182), 1, 7. 
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insolvent.174 Future cases are more likely to involve Part 2A or, perhaps, as 
in the recent Scottish Coal case discussed below, planning obligations and 
other environmental licenses.175  
Since Re Celtic Extraction, it seems to have been assumed that the 
power to disclaim onerous property in an insolvency proceeding includes 
the disclaimer of contaminated land. Thus, there would have to be at least 
“imminent and identifiable harm” to human health, as in the Midlantic 
exception, for a court – even it if was considered appropriate under U.K. 
law – to consider an exception to the disclaimer power. As discussed, how-
ever, Part 2A is much weaker than CERCLA (or, indeed, most State mini-
CERCLAs) and does not provide powers to local authorities to require ap-
propriate persons to remediate contamination that “may present an immi-
nent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment”, as in 
CERCLA. Still further, Part 2A is designed to postpone remediation rather 
than swiftly to carry it out.176 
The case in which the power to disclaim a contaminated site was as-
sumed is Environment Agency v. Hillridge Ltd.177 Hillridge involved the 
issue of whether the Environment Agency, as joint holder of a trust fund 
established as financial provision for the license, could access the fund.178 
The trust fund had been established by Hillridge Ltd., the holder of the 
waste management license, to satisfy the terms and conditions of the li-
cense. The liquidator had not only disclaimed the license as onerous prop-
erty, it had disclaimed the quarry in which the landfill was located, which 
was owned by Hillridge’s parent company, Waste Point Ltd. The judgment 
simply notes that “[u]ntil disclaimed by the joint liquidators of Waste Point 
on December 14, 2001, the Quarry had belonged at all material times to 
Waste Point. As a result of that disclaimer, Waste Point’s freehold interest 
in the Quarry escheated to the Crown.”179 The disclaimer of the site was 
not even an issue in the case despite Bradford City Council, the local au-
thority, having determined that it was contaminated land under Part 2A on 
16 January 2003, before the case was decided. Bradford City Council sub-
sequently remediated the site at public expense, including at least one grant 
 
 
174 See Agency to Tighten Grip on Financial Provisions for Landfill, 356 ENDS Rep. 38-
39 (Sept. 1, 2004). 
175 See Re Directions, Nimmo [2013] CSOH 124 ¶¶ 34-68 (Scot.) (appeal pending). 
176 See text accompanying notes 102-103. 
177 [2003] EWHC 3023, [2004] 2 B.C.L.C. 358 (Ch.) (Eng.). 
178 See Row on Financial Cover for Waste Sites Deepens, 269 ENDS Rep. 34 (June 1997). 
Under its agreement with the Environment Agency, Hillridge paid £367,273 into a joint 
trust account with the Environment Agency. The money included £332,583.78 from an 
accumulation account that had been established with the Bradford Metropolitan Borough 
Council as part of a section 106 agreement under the Town and Country Planning regime. 
By 30 September 2003, the joint trust fund contained £391,610.18, including further 
payments by West Point Ltd and interest. Env’t. Agency v. Hillridge Ltd., [2003] EWHC 
3023, [2004] 2 B.C.L.C. 358, ¶¶ 8-10 (Ch.) (Eng.). 
179 Env’t. Agency v. Hillridge Ltd., [2003] EWHC 3023, [2004] 2 B.C.L.C. 358, ¶ 3 (Ch.) 
(Eng.). 
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of £2 million from the contaminated land capital projects program.180 
Thus, whilst the contamination may not have posed imminent harm, it was 
certainly substantial. 
The Scottish Coal case, examined further in section VIII of this article, 
also involved the disclaimer of contaminated land and environmental per-
mits. The permits were for carrying out operations at Scottish Coal’s open 
cast mining sites to protect the environment from water pollution. Scottish 
Coal was also obliged under planning law to restore the sites when mining 
ceased.181 The legal issues in the case, which is on appeal, differ markedly 
from those under English law because there is no equivalent of section 178 
of the IA 1986 under Scots law. Lord Hodge agreed that the liquidators 
could disclaim the land and permits but did so because the court had to 
reach a decision that did not affect “referred matters,” that is, matters that 
had not devolved to Scotland under the Scotland Act 1998. Whereas envi-
ronmental law had devolved, insolvency law had not. The court was 
bound, therefore, to construe the relevant environmental law, the Water 
Environment (Controlled Activities) (Scotland) Regulations 2011, narrowly 
so as not to create a new liquidation expense that would rank ahead of the 
claims of preferential creditors.182  
The costs that the public may have to bear are huge. Scottish Coal had 
been spending about £1.4 million each month to maintain its sites in com-
pliance with the environmental permits. Even after selling some sites, it still 
has to spend £478,000 each month to maintain the unsold sites, with the 
result that all funds in the insolvency estate would be gone in between 20 
and 22 months without paying any creditors. Complying with planning 
requirements to remediate its sites would cost about £73 million.183  
In discussing Re Celtic Extraction, Lord Hodge concluded that provi-
sions in the environmental permits held by Scottish Coal that differed from 
those in the waste management licenses would have led him to conclude 
that the liquidators were required to comply with the surrender procedures 
in the permits. He also concluded that rulings by the CJEU since Re Celtic 
Extraction would have led him to construe the environmental legislation 
(which is derived from E.U. law) under which the permits were issued 
broadly.184 In particular, he commented that: 
 
 
180 See Marc Meneaud, £2m Won to Clear Up Manywells Tip, TELEGRAPH & ARGUS (Apr. 
14, 2009, 7:33 PM); Bradford Dist. Council, Manywells Landfill Remediation Newsletter 
(July 2006). 
181 Re Directions, Nimmo, [2013] C.S.O.H. 124, ¶ 5 (Scot.) (appeal pending); see Water 
Environment (Controlled Activities) (Scotland) Regulations 2011, S.S.I. 2011/209. 
182 Re Directions, Nimmo, [2013] C.S.O.H. 124, ¶¶ 64-68 (Scot.) (appeal pending). 
183 Id. ¶¶ 6-7. Scottish Coal had £27 million in restoration bonds for its sites in East 
Ayrshire but complying with planning conditions in restoring those sites would cost 
between £48 million and £90 million. See Isabella Kominski, KPMG Not Liable for 
Scottish Mine Restoration, 463 ENDS Rep. 21 (Sept. 2013). 
184 Re Directions, Nimmo, [2013] C.S.O.H. 124, ¶¶ 54-55 (Scot.) (appeal pending). 
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there is a strong public interest in the maintenance of a healthy environ-
ment, the remediation of pollution and the protection of biodiversity. 
There is a conflict between the results sought by the directive and the in-
solvency regime. I do not think that the insolvency regime has any primacy 
which means that [the Scottish transposing legislation] can exclude a liq-
uidator’s power to disclaim only if . . . it says so expressly.185 
An appeal by the Scottish Environment Protection Agency was heard 
in early September. The Agency commented, prior to the hearing, that it 
“believes in the polluter pays principle, which means that work to prevent 
damage to the environment should be funded by those whose activities cre-
ated the risk of pollution.”186 
Other insolvencies involving environmental claims have also occurred 
in the United Kingdom in 2013. For example, Greensolutions (Glasgow), a 
Northern Irish company, operated a soil washing business at a former 
gasworks site owned by Clyde Gateway (a regeneration agency) in 
Dalmarnock. Following a dispute with Clyde Gateway, Greensolutions 
moved its business to another site, leaving 6,500 cubic meters of spoil in 
four heaps at the Dalmarnock site.187 On 25 July 2013, the High Court of 
Justice in Northern Ireland accepted a petition by the Commissioners of 
H.M. Revenue & Customs to wind up the company. The Official Receiver 
was appointed as liquidator.188 
Another example involves Lawrence Recycling and Waste Manage-
ment, which entered administration in September 2013. The company, 
which had expanded in 2008,189 managed and operated a site at Kidder-
minster at which it had a permit to process 250,000 tonnes of waste per 
year. Massive fires occurred at the site in December 2012 and June 2013, 
with the latter taking seven-and-a-half weeks to extinguish due to the 
amount of waste waiting to be recycled at the site. The Environment Agen-
cy, Wyre Forest District Council, Hereford and Worcester Fire and Rescue 
Service, and Worcestershire County Council incurred costs of £250,000 as 
a result of the second fire. The costs included demolishing buildings at the 
site to allow access to the burning waste, removing and landfilling burnt 
waste, and using aeration equipment to prevent further fish kills and pollu-
tion from fire-fighting water from entering the Staffordshire and Worces-
 
 
185 Id. ¶ 51. 
186 SEPA Statement re Court of Session Decision, SCOTTISH ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION 
AGENCY (July 18, 2013), 
http://www.sepa.org.uk/about_us/news/2013/sepa_statement_re_court_of_ses.aspx. 
187 See David Leask, Row over Contaminated Soil at Clyde Gateway Site, EVENING TIMES 
(July 31, 2013), http://www.eveningtimes.co.uk/news/row-over-contaminated-soil-at-
clyde-gateway-site-131935n.21738198. 
188 See Jon Reeds, Cluster Site Company Liquidated, BROWNFIELD BRIEFING (Aug. 7, 
2013), http://www.brownfieldbriefing.com/news/cluster-site-company-liquidated 
(available on subscription). 
189 See Case Study: Lawrence Recycling and Waste Management; Materials Recovery 
Facility Opens New £10M Facility, WRAP (Dec. 2009), 
www.wrap.org.uk/sites/files/wrap/LawrenceWEB.pdf. 
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tershire Canal. In addition, the Environment Agency invoiced the company 
£12,686 and £120,000 for costs incurred due to the December 2012 and 
June 2013 fires, respectively.190 The Environment Agency and Wyre Forest 
District Council are creditors in the insolvency proceedings.191  
 
V. CORPORATE VEIL-PIERCING AND DIRECTORS’ LIABILITY IN 
RESPONSE TO ENVIRONMENTAL CLAIMS 
The role of companies in the context of environmental liability not 
only raises concerns in relation to the prospect of environmental claims 
being discharged through insolvency proceedings,192 but also more specifi-
cally the operation of the fundamental concepts of limited liability and 
separate corporate personality.193 These areas of English and Irish company 
law have not however been specially adapted to give effect to the goal of 
environmental protection, as explained in section VI below. The necessity 
therefore remains for finding ways to enhance the contaminated land re-
gime through reliance on alternative routes to attaching liability, aimed at 
ensuring stronger compliance with the polluter pays principle. Some of 
these alternative methods are considered in section VII.  
 
 
190 See Agencies Confirm Steps to Put out Fire at Lawrence Recycling, WYRE FOREST 
DIST. COUNCIL (July 17, 2013), 
http://www.wyreforestdc.gov.uk/cms/communications/news/2013/july-2013/agencies-
confirm-confirm-steps.aspx; Public Agencies Confirm Response to Fire at Lawrence 
Recycling, WYRE FOREST DIST. COUNCIL (June 26, 2013), 
http://www.wyreforestdc.gov.uk/cms/communications/news/2013/june-2013/multi-
agency-response-update.aspx; Becky Carr, Bill Continues to Mount for Lawrence 
Recycling Fire, The Shuttle (Aug. 8, 2013, 8:45 AM), 
http://www.kidderminstershuttle.co.uk/news/10599399.Bill_continues_to_mount_for_La
wrence_Recycling_fire/. 
191 See Becky Carr, Authorities Respond to Lawrence Entering Administration, 
WORCESTER NEWS (Sept. 12, 2013, 6:50 AM), 
http://www.worcesternews.co.uk/news/10668853.Authorities_respond_to_Lawrence_s_e
ntering_administration/.  
192 See generally Jeffrey S. Theuer, Aligning Environmental Policy and Bankruptcy 
Protection: Who Pays for Environmental Claims under the Bankruptcy Code?, 13 T.M. 
COOLEY L. REV. 465 (1996); Ingrid Michelsen Hillinger & Michael G. Hillinger, 
Environmental Affairs in Bankruptcy: 2004, 12 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 331 (2004); 
Arlene Elgart Mirsky, Richard J. Conway, Jr. & Geralyn G. Humphrey, The Interface 
between Bankruptcy and Environmental Laws, 46 BUS. LAW. 623 (1991). 
193 See generally George W. Dent, Jr., Limited Liability in Environmental Law, 26 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 151 (1991); David S. Bakst, Piercing the Corporate Veil for 
Environmental Torts in the United States and the European Union: The Case for the 
Proposed Civil Liability Directive, 19 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 323 (1996); K. 
Bergman, Bankruptcy, Limited Liability and CERCLA: Closing the Loophole and Parting 
the Veil, Univ. Md. Pub. L. Research Paper No. 2004-02. 
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VI. CLAIMS AGAINST DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS OF INSOLVENT 
COMPANIES AND COMPANIES WITH LIMITED ASSETS 
There are no English cases on whether the corporate veil may be 
pierced to hold a director or officer liable for the costs of remediating con-
tamination when the company has insufficient assets or is insolvent. The 
only reported English case is Buckinghamshire County Council v. Briar,194 
in which Mr. and Mrs. Briar were held liable under conventional principles 
for the costs of cleaning up a site on which waste had been unlawfully 
tipped. The court concluded that the corporate veil should be pierced on 
the basis that the company to which they had transferred the land was a 
façade or sham and had been used as a device “to conceal the true 
facts.”195   
Courts in Ireland and, to a lesser extent Canada, have been faced with 
the difficult issue of whether directors and officers of companies that have 
insufficient funds to remediate contamination are liable for the costs of 
remediating it. 
A.  Environmental Claims against Directors and Officers in Ireland 
The issue in Environmental Protection Agency v. Neiphin Trading 
Ltd.196 was whether the Irish High Court had the power to impose “fall 
back” orders on directors and officers of a company that had insufficient 
assets to remediate contamination caused by it. The court found that the 
power to make fall-back orders sprang from its inherent veil-piercing juris-
diction, and not from provisions of the Waste Management Act 1996 or 
the polluter pays principle: 
[A]lthough the principle of separate corporate personality is not set in 
stone . . .  the Court cannot disregard the fundamental nature of the sepa-
rate legal personality principle and . . . in the absence of an express statu-
tory abridgment of that principle, the Court should lean against an inter-
pretation permitting the corporate veil to be pierced. This is in the inter-
ests of legal certainty, a very important principle underpinning our law.  
 [A]lthough a jurisdiction does already exist to lift the veil of incorpora-
tion in the case of a company being used for a fraudulent or other improp-
er purpose that jurisdiction, which is of long standing, is intended to en-
sure (a) that a statutory privilege is not abused, and (b) that the Court’s 
own process is not abused. Every Court is entitled as a matter of inherent 
jurisdiction to seek to protect its own process and may in an appropriate 
case lift the corporate veil to ensure that its order are not frustrated by a 
cynical and strategic reliance on the principle of separate corporate per-
sonality by the directors (or shareholders) of a company. Whenever, under 
the planning code, a Court has seen fit to lift the corporate veil . . . it has 
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invariably done so to that end. If the polluter pays principle only required 
the lifting of the veil in similar circumstances s.57 and s.58 could be har-
moniously interpreted on the basis that the necessary jurisdiction already 
exists and is of long standing. However, it demands more than that. It 
demands that the polluter should pay in all circumstances which may re-
quire the veil to be lifted in any case where a company cannot comply, 
even in cases where the shareholders /directors are not fraudulently or im-
properly attempting to hide behind the company. The jurisprudence of the 
Irish Courts has long set its face against such an incursion. Absent the ex-
istence of a fraudulent or improper purpose the Courts will not lift the 
corporate veil unless authorized to do so by statute.197  
Thus, “insofar as the polluter pays principle forms part of the land-
scape of environmental law” in Ireland, its scope did not appear to extend 
to enabling the courts to impose fall-back orders on individuals whose sole 
connection to the environmental pollution was their position as directors 
or shareholders of a company held liable under the waste management leg-
islation.198 In other words, “the ‘polluter pays’ principle cannot . . . be used 
to infer provisions into the law which simply are not there” thereby impos-
ing liability where it would not otherwise exist. 199, 
It should however be noted that this decision was made against the 
backdrop of “a dispute as to the status of the ‘polluter pays’ principle in 
EU law and the extent to which those very Directives which the 1996 
[Waste Management] Act was enacted to transpose actually require the 
application of the ‘polluter pays’ principle.”200 The Irish High Court con-
cluded from a consideration of the 1996 Act as a whole that the polluter 
pays principle had only been incorporated to a “fairly limited” extent by 
the Irish legislature.201 There were “very limited references” to it within the 
1996 Act, and the provision which was previously seen202 as incorporating 
the principle “merely define[d] it.”203 As claims in Ireland have tended to 
involve waste legislation,204  this is a significant aspect of the Neiphin 
judgment. 
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This may be seen from the subsequent decision of the Irish High 
Court in John Ronan & Sons v. Clean Build Ltd.,205 which also involved 
the question of liability under the Waste Management Act 1996. Clarke J. 
recognized that “the status of the ‘polluter pays’ principle under Irish law 
but moreover the question of its relevance are matters of some dispute” 
before turning to examine “the wider context and genesis” of the principle 
and review the Irish jurisprudence.206 He considered the finding in Neiphin 
that the polluter pays principle could not be used to infer non-existent pro-
visions into the law did “not suggest the polluter pays principle should not 
be given any consideration at all by the court nor [did] it address circum-
stances where a director or shareholder is found to be independently liable 
under the 1996 Act.”207 Thus, “where primary liability under the Act could 
be found to attach to a respondent, who also happened to be a director or 
shareholder of another respondent, then there was no need to make a ‘fall-
back’ order unless such liability were found to have been incorrectly at-
tributed in view of the provisions of the 1996 Act.”208 It was  
clear that a person in a position similar to that of being a manager, super-
visor or operator of a relevant activity is a holder for the purposes of the 
1996 Act. The fact that the business may be conducted by a corporate en-
tity does not prevent individuals (whether they be directors, shareholders 
or otherwise) from being managers, supervisors or operators.209  
Personal liability could accordingly be imposed on the directors on the 
basis of their “active role in the management and control of the site.”210 It 
is inferred from the reasoning in this case that directors with a more pas-
sive role in the management of a company would not be caught by the def-
inition of a “holder” of waste.211 
B.  Environmental Claims against Directors and Officers in Cana-
da 
A recent case involving claims against directors and officers for reme-
diating contamination concerns Northstar Aerospace (Canada) Inc. and its 
predecessors (“Northstar”). Northstar owned and operated a helicopter 
and aircraft parts manufacturing facility in Cambridge, Ontario, from 
1981 to 2010. In 2004, Northstar discovered trichloroethylene (“TCE”) 
and hexavalent chromium in groundwater migrating from the site into a 
nearby residential area. Concentrations of TCE in 450 residences exceeded 
health-based standards. Northstar notified the Ontario Ministry of Envi-
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ronment (“MOE”)212 and, between 2004 and 2012, voluntarily carried out 
investigatory, mitigation and remedial measures, including monitoring air 
in the residences, and created an accounting reserve of C$22.8 million for 
the measures. 
In 2012, after the MOE became concerned that Northstar would not 
have sufficient funds to continue remediating and monitoring the contami-
nation, it issued EPA Orders against Northstar and its U.S. parent compa-
ny, Northstar Aerospace Inc., requiring them to continue carrying out the 
measures and to provide C$10 million in financial assurance to ensure 
funding for the measures. 
On 14 June 2012, Northstar and two related Canadian companies 
applied for and were granted orders protecting them and staying proceed-
ings against them and their directors and officers under the CCAA. At the 
same time, Northstar’s parent company filed proceedings in U.S. Bank-
ruptcy Court. All the directors of Northstar, none of which had held their 
positions when the contamination occurred, resigned, leaving two officers 
to manage the company and continue remedial measures to the extent 
permitted under the CCAA order. The court further ordered that the direc-
tors and officers should be granted a charge on the companies’ property 
not exceeding C$1,750,000 as security for indemnities by the companies to 
them. 
On 27 June 2012, the court approved the sale of Northstar’s assets, 
rejecting the MOE’s request to disapprove the sale or not distribute the 
proceeds on the basis that its orders were regulatory orders not subject to 
the stay. The court concluded that the orders should be stayed because 
their purpose was enforcement of Northstar’s payment obligations. Virtu-
ally all of Northstar’s assets other than the site were subsequently sold and 
distributed. The sale proceeds were insufficient to pay Northstar’s secured 
lenders, leaving no assets available for unsecured creditors.  On 2 August 
2012, the court ordered a claims procedure against Northstar’s directors 
and officers concerning obligations and liabilities that had arisen after the 
CCAA proceedings had begun. 
On 24 August 2012, Northstar was declared bankrupt and ceased 
carrying out remedial measures. The remaining asset, the site, vested in the 
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trustee in bankruptcy, who disclaimed its interest in it, with the result that 
the MOE had a secured claim for remedial and monitoring measures 
against the site and an unsatisfied secured claim against Northstar. The 
MOE then continued the remedial measures. 
On 14 November 2012, soon after the stay expired, the MOE issued a 
further EPA Order against Northstar’s 12 former directors and officers 
requiring them to carry out measures that the MOE had previously re-
quired Northstar to carry out at an estimated annual cost of C$1.4 million. 
The MOE also claimed against them for about C$15 million for its past 
and future remedial costs, contending that they knew about the contamina-
tion and had managed and controlled the site between 2003 and 2012. The 
EPA Order has priority to existing secured claims, meaning that if the 
MOE’s claims are accepted, up to C$1.75 million from the proceeds of the 
sale of the site would be paid to the MOE. There are, however, no bidders 
for the site. 
The directors and officers appealed to the Environmental Review Tri-
bunal to stay the order on the grounds that they did not cause the contam-
ination or have the requisite control of Northstar’s activities and property. 
The Tribunal refused, concluding that they had not established that paying 
remedial costs would result in irreparable harm to them. The directors and 
officers appealed and sought judicial review to the Ontario Divisional 
Court on the basis that they could not defray or recover the costs. The 
court rejected the appeals on the basis that an interim decision of the Tri-
bunal is not subject to an appeal and that judicial review may only be 
sought following a final decision by the Tribunal. The court noted that the 
Environmental Protection Act specifically bars the Tribunal from staying 
the operation of a decision if the stay would endanger human health or 
safety or impair or result in a serious risk of impairment of any property, 
plant or animal. 
However, although an overall stay was not precluded by section 
143(3) of the Act since the MOE’s actions in taking over the remediation 
work had reduced the threat to human health and safety posed by the con-
taminants at the site, the appellants had not shown that the financial harm 
they would suffer would be irreparable and this strictly financial prejudice 
should be weighed against the “harm to the public interest that would re-
sult from the granting of a stay.”213 Ironically, although the Tribunal’s as-
sessment of the “irreparable harm” factor had noted that the directors 
might be able to recover the costs of complying with the EPA Order from a 
C$1.75 million charge on the assets of Northstar Canada, set aside in the 
CCAA proceedings to indemnify the directors and officers of the company 
(“D&O Charge”);214 it was determined by the CCAA court that the direc-
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tors and officers were “not entitled to the benefit of the D&O Charge Re-
serve.”215 Moreover, the MOE’s claims against the directors and officers 
did not entitle it to recourse against the D&O Charge as this would enable 
it to improve its unsecured status by issuing EPA Orders for remediation 
“after the commencement of CCAA Proceedings, based on an environmen-
tal condition which occurred long before the CCAA Proceedings,” thereby 
achieving indirectly a result which it could not achieve directly.216 
Ultimately therefore, not only were the directors and officers required 
to comply with the EPA Order to remediate while it was under appeal, but 
the litigation demonstrates the high levels of personal liability to which 
directors and officers are exposed in the context of environmental liability, 
and the inadequacy of the insolvency regime to provide relief at the ex-
pense of the priority status of creditors.217 In contrast to cases where debtor 
companies and directors are exempt from liability and the cost of remedia-
tion is shouldered by public authorities, the subjection to cleanup liabilities 
in this case of directors who had no personal involvement in the circum-
stances surrounding the contamination, may be a source of some disqui-
et.218 At the other extreme, the outcome may encourage regulatory authori-
ties to more proactively seek to ensure that clean-up responsibilities are 
imposed on directors and officers  at the earliest opportunity.   
VII. DEVELOPING OTHER AVENUES OF LIABILITY 
The heightened focus on directors’ liability seen above in relation to 
Ireland and Canada draws attention to the importance of developing other 
effective avenues of liability to respond to the problem of corporate envi-
ronmental liability. This is considered below with respect to direct parent 
company liability, and the development of directors’ duties in the United 
Kingdom. 
A. Direct Parent Company Liability 
Although the ability to pierce the corporate veil to reach parent com-
panies is extremely limited in English law,219 the recent Court of Appeal 
decision in Chandler v. Cape PLC.220 raises the prospect of direct liability 
based on a parent company’s conduct. The matter involved a claim by an 
employee who had contracted asbestosis through his employment with a 
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subsidiary of Cape PLC, and the question was thus whether Cape PLC 
bore any liability as the parent of the employer company. In particular, 
could a duty of care on the part of Cape PLC to its subsidiary’s employees 
be established on the basis of an assumption of responsibility?221 Assessing 
the evidence, the court found that Cape PLC owed a direct duty of care to 
the employees, and that this case demonstrated that 
in appropriate circumstances the law may impose on a parent company re-
sponsibility for the health and safety of its subsidiary's employees. Those 
circumstances include a situation where, as in the present case: 
(1) the businesses of the parent and subsidiary are in a relevant respect the  
same; 
(2) the parent has, or ought to have, superior knowledge on some relevant 
aspect of health and safety in the particular industry; 
(3) the subsidiary's system of work is unsafe as the parent company knew, 
or ought to have known; and    
(4) the parent knew or ought to have foreseen that the subsidiary or its 
employees would rely on its using that superior knowledge for the em-
ployees' protection.222 
The decision is expected to pave the way for more cases to be brought 
against parent companies arising from the operations of their subsidiaries 
where it can be shown that the parent company’s conduct justifies the im-
position of liability.223 It furthermore highlights, in corporate group con-
texts and parent/subsidiary relationships, the implications of sharing in-
formation or technical knowledge.224 The outcome is thus strongly relevant 
from an environmental protection perspective, and although it remains to 
be seen whether – and how – this approach  might develop beyond the field 
of health and safety, particularly in relation to late-manifesting harms or 
damage;  it accords with the U.S. approach to direct liability of parent 
companies. In United States v. Bestfoods,225 an action for the costs of 
cleaning up industrial waste, the U.S. Supreme Court held that “a corpo-
rate parent that actively participated in, and exercised control over, the 
operations of [a polluting facility owned and operated by the subsidiary] 
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may be held directly liable in its own right as an operator of the facility”;226 
“The question is not whether the parent operates the subsidiary, but rather 
whether it operates the facility, and that operation is evidenced by partici-
pation in the activities of the facility, not the subsidiary.”227 By compari-
son, activities involving the facility which were consistent with the parent 
company’s role as investor, “such as monitoring of the subsidiary’s per-
formance, supervision of the subsidiary’s finance and capital budget deci-
sions, and articulation of general policies and procedures,” would not in-
voke direct liability.228 The central issue was whether “in degree and de-
tail,” actions directed at the facility on behalf of the parent company were 
“eccentric under accepted norms of parental oversight of a subsidiary’s 
facility.”229 
Bestfoods shows that a parent company may be directly liable as an 
“operator” on a construction of relevant environmental legislation,230 quite 
independently of the application of tort-based concepts of responsibility 
seen in Chandler. Direct liability recognizes the strong influence exerted by 
parent companies on the activities of their subsidiaries.231 The decision in 
Chandler has moreover drawn attention to the importance of tort law as 
an instrument for environmental protection. Tort law, as a compensation 
and risk-control mechanism,232 supports the goals of environmental protec-
tion in two significant ways:  
Tort law allows the victims of irresponsible corporate conduct to bring ac-
tions against the enterprise and to seek damages for the harm caused by 
business activities. This results not only in the direct compensation of in-
jured parties but also forces corporations to incorporate negative external-
ities into the costs of their business activities. This provides a disincentive 
to the externalization of risks, deters corporations from engaging in overly 
risky activities and motivates corporations to apply and monitor certain 
corporate standards.233 
Nevertheless, it is acknowledged that as a mechanism focused on of-
fering redress in respect of harm to persons and property, tort law is “ill 
equipped to deal with environmental issues.”234 This includes situations 
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where, for instance, the damaged natural resources are un-owned235 or no 
person is affected.236 Although strong arguments can be made in favor of 
expanding the scope of tort law to provide protection for environmental 
interests,237 its inherent limitations may prevent it from playing a major 
role in this context. Tort law focuses on harm rather than risks,238 and as a 
mechanism aimed at cure rather than prevention,239 encounters difficulties 
such as establishing causation and responsibility in complex cases240 and 
the quantification of harm.241 An alteration to “the internal conceptual and 
normative geography of tort law”242 would be necessary to overcome its 
principal fault-liability base,243 and its emphasis on harm to persons.244 
Suggestions include “extending the catalogue of rights” recognized by tort 
law to encompass individual interests in the environment, and imposing of 
forms of strict liability for more hazardous activities.245 For the time being 
however, the ability to pursue a parent company as sole/joint tortfeasor246 
as seen in Chandler, provides a significant advantage bearing in mind the 
low incidence of veil-piercing with respect to tort claims.247 Tort law can 
thus enable reparation to be provided which would otherwise be unavaila-
ble as a result of the operation of established principles of corporate law, 
such as separate legal personality.248  
 
 
 
 
235 See Michael Anderson, Transnational Corporations and Environmental Damage : Is 
Tort Law the Answer?, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 399, 409 (2002). 
236 See Reinschmidt, supra note 231, at 106. 
237 See id. at 110-11; Anderson, supra note 235, at 408-10. 
238 Peter Cane, Using Tort Law to Enforce Environmental Regulations?, 41 WASHBURN 
L.J. 427, 429 (2002).  
239 Id. at 441.  
240 Anderson, supra note 235, at 409. 
241 Id. at 410. 
242 Reinschmidt, supra note 231, at 110. 
243 Cane, supra note 238, at 448.  
244 Id.; Reinschmidt, supra note 231, at 110. 
245 Reinschmidt, id. 
246 See id. at 108 (proposing same). 
247 Charles Mitchell, Lifting the Corporate Veil in the English Courts: An Empirical 
Study, 3 CO. FINANCIAL & INSOLVENCY L. REV. 15, 24 (1993); see U.S. study by Robert 
Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1036, 
1058 (1991); and in Australia by Ian M. Ramsay & David B. Noakes, Piercing the 
Corporate Veil in Australia, 19 CO. & SECURITIES L.J. 250-71 (2001), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=299488 at 2 (last visited Sept. 14, 
2013). 
248 See David M. Ong, The Impact of Environmental Law on Corporate Governance: 
International and Comparative Perspectives, 12 EUROPEAN J. INTL. L. 685, 698 (2001) 
(“established corporate legal principles such as that which provides for the separate legal 
personality of different  companies within the same group of companies prevent the 
imposition of corporate environmental liability on the whole group”). 
Environmental Claims and Insolvent Companies 
625 
B. Incorporation of Environmental Concerns into Directors’ Duties in 
the United Kingdom 
The necessity for finding ways to surmount the barriers presented by 
traditional corporate law principles is further demonstrated by the U.K. 
experience of the introduction of a statutory duty for directors to promote 
the company’s success with regard to various factors, including “the im-
pact of the company's operations on the community and the environ-
ment.”249 Viewed against the backdrop of proposals for the reform of cor-
porate governance to “include incorporation of environmental concerns 
within the scope of directors’ duties, either explicitly by legislation, or im-
plicitly by the extension of fiduciary duties owed to the company”250 it may 
be seen as a progressive step.251 However, a reading of the provision shows 
that 
In construing the statutory list of factors relevant to determine whether a 
director acted to promote the success of the company, it is essential to in-
terpret the constituent parts of the list in the context of promoting the best 
interests of company shareholders. In the context of shareholder interests, 
one would imagine, although it is not specifically alluded to in the list of 
factors to be considered, that success will continue to be viewed primarily 
in a commercial context, so measured by the profitability of the company 
and its ability to declare healthy dividends.252 
In promoting the company’s success “for the benefit of its members as 
a whole,” it is not evident whether a director will be liable for a breach of 
the section 172 duty if despite “generating profits and a healthy dividend, 
matters relevant to . . . the community, environment or future business 
reputation of the company are only afforded a negligible or indeed nil con-
sideration.”253 These misgivings are reinforced by the outcome of an early 
attempt to enforce this aspect of the section 172 duty in the case of R. (on 
the application of People and Planet) v. H.M. Treasury.254 This involved an 
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application by People and Planet, an organization campaigning for action 
on climate change and respect for human rights, to bring judicial review 
proceedings in relation to the policy adopted by H.M. Treasury with re-
gards to the Government’s 70 per cent shareholding in the Royal Bank of 
Scotland (“RBS”) acquired as a result of substantial financial support pro-
vided during the market turmoil of 2008. The court rejected the argument 
that H.M. Treasury should have sought to impose its policies vis-à-vis 
combating climate change and the promotion of human rights on RBS’ 
Board of Directors on the ground that it “would clearly have a tendency to 
come into conflict with, and hence would cut across, the duties of the RBS 
Board as set out in section 172(1),”255 including their statutory obligation 
“to manage the company for the benefit of the shareholders as a whole and 
acting fairly as between them.”256 It would furthermore give rise to “a real 
risk of litigation” by minority shareholders complaining that the Govern-
ment’s efforts to impose its policy on the Board of RBS had detrimentally 
affected the value of their shares.257 Decisions regarding the management of 
RBS were matters for the judgment of the directors of RBS.258 While H.M. 
Treasury could “properly seek to influence the Board of RBS to have re-
gard to environmental and human rights considerations in accordance with 
the Board’s duty under section 172,” the pursuit of a more interventionist 
policy would create a risk of pressing the RBS Board beyond the limits of 
their own duties.259 The case may thus be seen as illustrating the extent to 
which section 172 “has raised expectations that it cannot deliver,” and the 
ineffectuality of company law as a “vehicle for the achievement of envi-
ronmental or human rights objectives beyond what the law requires gener-
ally.”260 It also weakens somewhat the prospect that stakeholders to whom 
no direct duty is owed under section 172 may still bring judicial challenges 
against deficiencies in directors’ decision-making with respect to “stake-
holder regard and engagement.”261 Recent empirical research has found 
that in well-run companies’ engagement with stakeholders can surpass the 
“mere consideration of interests” indicated in section 172, encompassing 
“consultation and feedback, resulting in a loop of continuous learning and 
modification on the part of the company.”262 Thus while the impact of sec-
tion 172 appears limited by virtue of its construction and enforceability,263 
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it may nevertheless assist in exerting a positive influence on corporate pro-
cesses and conduct.  
The possibility of an expansive application of section 172 is further-
more hampered by the dual role of the provision. It not only forms an ex-
press duty for directors, but within the statutory framework for the overall 
enforcement of directors’ duties through a derivative action, the view of a 
director acting in accordance with section 172 presents a mandatory and a 
discretionary bar to a court’s permission  to continue a derivative claim. 
That is to say, where a member of the company seeks permission to con-
tinue a derivative claim under section 261 or section 262, a court must 
dismiss the application if it is satisfied (inter alia) that a person acting in 
accordance with section 172 would not seek to continue the claim; or if the 
application is not precluded by one of the mandatory bars to continuance 
in section 263(2), the court must take into account (inter alia) the im-
portance that a person acting in accordance with section 172 would attach 
to continuing the claim.264 The cases applying this “hypothetical director” 
test show that it has been strongly influential in the development of the 
recently-introduced statutory derivative action.265 Of particular interest is 
the judicial implementation of the test with reference to factors centered on 
the financial and commercial consequences of the proceedings for the com-
pany:  
They include: the size of the claim; the strength of the claim; the cost of 
the proceedings; the company's ability to fund the proceedings; the ability 
of the potential defendants to satisfy a judgment; the impact on the com-
pany if it lost the claim and had to pay not only its own costs but the de-
fendant's as well; any disruption to the company's activities while the 
claim is pursued; whether the prosecution of the claim would damage the 
company in other ways (e.g. by losing the services of a valuable employee 
or alienating a key supplier or customer) and so on.266 
Notably, “t]he weighing of all these considerations is essentially a 
commercial decision, which the court is ill-equipped to take, except in a 
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clear case.” Therefore the courts remain “wary of . . . substituting their 
judgment for the business judgment of directors,”267 but it is clear that 
their perspective of the hypothetical directors’ views is shaped by the direct 
interests of the company rather than much wider considerations. Human 
rights, community and environmental issues may be treated as “external to 
the company” while those pertaining to “employees and creditors are in-
ternal.”268 For the moment, it seems that corporate social responsibility 
concerns “will be considered by a court if the claimant can establish a di-
rect benefit to the company through bringing a claim.”269 The courts’ en-
dorsement of a stakeholder-driven performance by directors of their sec-
tion 172 duty to promote the company’s success would thus sit uncomfort-
ably with the status of the hypothetical director test as a check on the en-
forcement of directors’ duties generally. 
In the absence of a directors’ duty which sanctions “profit-sacrificing 
behavior motivated by environmental concerns”270 and complementary 
ease of enforcement, it is also arguable that the prospect of criminal liabil-
ity provides stronger incentives for directors to comply with environmental 
requirements. With respect to the EPA 1990 for instance, which provides 
for corporate and personal criminal liability where an offence “is proved to 
have been committed with the consent or connivance of, or  . . . attributa-
ble to any neglect on the part of any director, manager, secretary or other 
similar officer,”271 it is noted that the presence of sound environmental 
management systems may provide a defense.272 This is particularly relevant 
to offences which do not provide for strict liability, but are couched in 
terms of reasonableness, practicability and diligence.273 Ong makes a simi-
lar observation in relation to fault-based criminal liability, that  
where a corporate offence has in fact been committed, it will be very diffi-
cult to avoid a finding of negligence on the part of one or more of the di-
rectors or other company officers, unless there is convincing evidence of 
the existence and efficient operation of sound and comprehensive corpo-
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rate environmental management systems designed to ensure full compli-
ance with the law.274 
It has been held by a U.K. court that the policy underlying provisions 
relating to corporate offences is to “encourage those who direct or control 
[companies or corporate bodies] to promote the purposes of the legislation 
as a whole.”275 Consequently, a director may be prosecuted in accordance 
with the EPA 1990 without the company having been convicted of the of-
fence or prosecuted in the same proceedings.276 This is in keeping with the 
notion that environmental statutes seek to promote responsible conduct 
and are often underpinned by the philosophy that environmental harm is 
avertible.277 The treatment of environmental offences is further supported 
by the formal oversight and review of sentencing practices, to ensure clarity 
and consistency.278 The desire to avoid criminal liability should encourage 
boards of directors to pursue “sound corporate environmental manage-
ment policy” which “transcends mere compliance with environmental law 
and becomes intrinsic to the overall corporate policy decision-making 
structure.”279 This deterrent effect is reinforced by the exposure of directors 
who have been convicted of an indictable offence in connection with the 
management of a company, to disqualification from the promotion, for-
mation, or management of another company without the leave of the 
court, under the U.K. Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986.280 
Corporate environmental management systems therefore not only contrib-
ute to the protection of companies and their officers from possible envi-
ronmental liability, but enable them to strengthen their corporate reputa-
tion, and gain a competitive advantage as well as “strategic data for longer 
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term business planning.”281 Exposure to criminal sanctions in insolvency 
may, by contrast, bring the interests of the company and its management 
into direct conflict with their environmental responsibilities, as seen in the 
recent liquidation of the Scottish Coal Company Ltd., in which the liquida-
tors’ concern that the risks associated with open cast mining sites “could 
involve potential liabilities which could incur criminal penalties” was 
among the factors justifying the disclaimer of certain sites and statutory 
licenses shortly after the commencement of the liquidation.282 
VIII. MINIMIZING THE IMPACT OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
INSOLVENCIES IN PRACTICE 
Recent U.K. liquidations demonstrate the extent to which efforts are 
made in practice to reduce the impact of environmental insolvencies. For 
the Scottish Coal Company Ltd. and U.K. Coal Operations Ltd., discussed 
in Part IV above, entry into liquidation provided a means of protecting the 
insolvent estate from depletion through compliance with on-going clean up 
or maintenance obligations. In Re Directions, Nimmo,283 involving the dis-
claimer by Scottish Coal Company (“SCC”) of some of its sites and statu-
tory licenses or permits, it was acknowledged that: 
SCC’s directors applied for the company to be wound up rather than ap-
point an administrator because it was insolvent and did not wish the cost 
of performing its environmental obligations to use up the funds realized 
from the sale of its assets. . . . . The [liquidators] wish to protect SCC's un-
secured creditors and the bank, as holder of the floating charge, from the 
dissipation of the proceeds of disposal of SCC's assets which continued 
performance of the statutory obligations will entail.284  
The funds available would meet the considerable cost of maintaining 
the sites under the liquidators’ control (which had gone down from £1.4 
million to £478,000 following the sale of several sites) for no more than 20 
to 22 months.285 Compared with the estimated £10.5 million to be raised 
from the realization of assets, the costs of restoring the sites in accordance 
with SCC’s obligations would be about £73 million.286 Similarly, U.K. 
Coal’s liquidators justified the disclaimer of a colliery destroyed by fire 
immediately following their appointment on the basis that this “was a high 
risk site with substantial liabilities attaching to it. The costs of securing and 
holding the mine (which we expected to exceed £100,000 per week) would 
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have been an expense and, as such, these costs would have been paid ahead 
of the dividend to creditors.”287 
However, an examination of both insolvencies also reveals that dis-
claimer was effected in the context of transactions encompassing sales of 
other assets, making it possible for some business operations and employ-
ment to be preserved.288 U.K. Coal first entered administration, a statutory 
procedure whose primary goal is the rescue of the company as a going con-
cern,289 and completed a restructuring which included the transfer of the 
majority of its business and assets and a compromise with major creditors, 
before entering liquidation and disclaiming the damaged mine.290 To expe-
dite the formal administration procedure, which only lasted a few days, the 
administrators were excused by the High Court291 from compliance with 
the statutory requirements to send out proposals for achieving the purposes 
of the administration,292 and convening an initial creditors’ meeting293 on 
the basis of commercial necessity. As part of what the court described as 
“restructuring following sophisticated advice,”294 the national Pension Pro-
tection Fund (“PPF”) took over U.K. Coal’s £543 million pension deficit.295 
In return, it would receive payments in the form of debt instruments from 
the new company to which the viable mining operations had been trans-
ferred, which were “expected, over time, to be materially higher than any 
sum it would have received” had the company simply gone into liquida-
tion.296 
In similar vein, the acquisition of assets from SCC and another liqui-
dating company Aardvark (TMC) Ltd. was structured in a way which 
sought to combine the immediate purchase of viable sites with the longer-
term absorption of sites requiring restoration.297 Independently of the sale 
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of secured debt, movable and immovable property, the two insolvent com-
panies’ interest in problematic sites was hived down to companies owned 
by them (“HiveCos”) with the aim of addressing “outstanding restoration 
liabilities.”298 The purchaser, Hargreaves Services plc., (“HSP”) would 
support mining activities at the HiveCo sites,299 in addition to gaining ex-
clusive options for the future purchase of shares in the HiveCos.300 These 
options would be exercised to take over the HiveCos and integrate them 
into HSP’s corporate group if the “outstanding restoration issues [were] 
resolved on commercially acceptable terms.”301 It was observed on behalf 
of HSP that a restructuring process of this kind “significantly reduced” the 
number of properties requiring disclaimer by the liquidators.302 This indi-
cates that there is scope for pragmatic solutions to evolve in response to 
environmental liabilities, and such solutions may be more heavily reliant 
on contractual techniques. Confining our concerns to the problems associ-
ated with disclaimer risks obscuring the related transactions within a be-
spoke company rescue initiative. It furthermore creates the danger that le-
gal reforms focused on particular aspects of the treatment of environmental 
liability in insolvency may undermine the flexibility and effectiveness of the 
practical solutions which are currently being deployed.  
IX. CONCLUSIONS 
While the reach of the polluter pays principle has been extended from 
the international trade context to national regimes for the remediation of 
contamination from historic pollution, company and insolvency law re-
main remarkably untouched. Although the discussion in Part II demon-
strates differing approaches between the United States and the United 
Kingdom to this issue, strong similarities are identifiable  between many of 
the difficulties which arise in insolvency/bankruptcy proceedings. These 
include the discharge of liabilities through reorganization and the aban-
donment or disclaimer of burdensome property, and have been shown to 
be pertinent to other common law jurisdictions including Canada, Ireland, 
Australia and New Zealand. The case authorities from these jurisdictions 
are linked by the limited application of the polluter pays principle in the 
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context of insolvency proceedings. The successful imposition of directors’ 
liability in recent Irish and Canadian cases has leant heavily on the role of 
the environmental legislation, rather than the intervention of company or 
insolvency law.  
At the same time, the pre-occupation with the relationship between 
the principle of limited liability and the protection of the environment303 
reflects an expectation that insofar as environmental harm is caused by 
companies, company law will provide a means of resolving it. It therefore 
remains crucial to examine developments in this field in light of their im-
plications for environmental protection. This includes the recognition of 
direct parent company liability, and developments in corporate governance 
which give rise to some anticipation of the emergence of a directors’ duty 
to protect environmental interests304 – especially at present when considera-
tion is being given by the U.K. Government to proposals for strengthening 
the regulation of directors by amending their statutory duties for key sec-
tors, enabling regulators to disqualify directors in their sector; and permit-
ting material breaches of relevant sectoral regulation, together with the 
scale of loss suffered by creditors and impact on wider society, to be taken 
into account in disqualification proceedings.305 Targeting parent company 
and managerial decision-making vis-à-vis a company’s activities306 can con-
tribute to the development of more responsible conduct on the part of its 
controllers, while other areas of law such as tort law and criminal law can 
likewise play an important part in improving business practices and ex-
panding corporate environmental liability. 
The restructuring activities of the Scottish Coal Company and U.K. 
Coal Ltd. demonstrate the potential for creative practical responses to en-
vironmental insolvencies, which place limited reliance on formal proce-
dures. More soberingly though, they indicate that high site maintenance 
and restoration costs are seen as destructive to attempts to rescue the busi-
ness and in fact encourage recourse to liquidation proceedings for the pur-
pose of disclaiming sites and licenses.  This dichotomy exemplifies the con-
tinuing challenge for the various national regimes outlined in this paper, of 
working towards a more collaborative relationship between environmental, 
company and insolvency law.  
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